

# THEOLOGY

A Monthly Journal of Historic Christianity

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## EDITORIAL

PREDICTION is ill-work in a monthly periodical, above all at the opening of a momentous session of the Council of the League of Nations. No one can say on September 5th whether the Italian desire for military glory will in a month's time have begun to bear its bitter fruit, or will have been overcome (or driven underground to bide its time) by the pressure of the other nations. One thing, however, does seem clear. There is in this country an overwhelming majority in favour not only of collective security but of using the present distress as a starting-point for some better way of ordering international life. The middle-aged can remember the prevalence of a very different temper, when an incident (Fashoda, for example) would set national pride in a ferment. It might indeed happen again, inasmuch as national pride is a sensitive thing. But it is less likely. The recrudescence of idol-worship all round us has revealed to us the sinister cruelty of the cult. We have begun to see that the lust for glory at the expense of others is a vile thing. And even apart from that, we are slowly learning the constructive lesson of co-operative internationalism. The best hope in the present crisis is that some of the man-made barriers, political and economic, which de-limit possessions, spheres of influence, mandated territories, and conceptions of what is implied in national "sovereignty," will begin to be re-arranged on principles, not of aggression but of equity. Great European nations need room for the expansion of their economic life. The less civilized parts of the world need the help of European capital and European science if they are to yield their full harvests. What Newman said of a gentleman, that he will not willingly inflict pain, is not true of the individual only. We are dimly discerning that much of what is needed can be arranged and ought to be arranged without wars of conquest, but in such ways



as will serve the needs of all. The League of Nations exists not merely to prevent war, but to educate the inhabitants of the world in larger citizenship; or, to put it more hopefully, to mobilize in the form of effective national policies the large good will which exists already.

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The Church Congress has chosen its subject wisely: "Christianity in the Modern State." The majority of those who read this journal, being students of theology, probably find their main interest in approaching Christianity as Truth. This does not mean that they forget that it is also Life. But they are acutely conscious that a religion, if it fail altogether to commend itself on intellectual grounds, will not survive. No one will then bother about religious reactions upon life because (to use a barbarous word) there will be no re-agent. In the meantime, while this perpetual controversy is proceeding, large numbers of people look at Christianity from quite another point of view. Leaving theology to others, they ask, "Does it work? Can we in modern life be Christians?"

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The query sometimes relates to the hard conditions of industrial and business life. Is it possible for the young man in an office, or the young woman behind the counter, to be honest, and self-forgetful, and public-spirited? Are they not driven to tell lies, and to work for their own hands, and every now and then to deceive clients and customers?

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Other forms of the query, more than ever of late years, relate to the claims of the modern state. These have become everywhere much larger, and in some quarters all-including. For the citizen to submit to large claims may well be a duty, but the "all" is damning. The new word Totalitarian represents what to Christian people must be profane and impossible. Nothing can be Totalitarian but God. In fact, it was the believers in God who taught Totalitarians the idea. The new German and Italian politics are an example of that stealing the thunder of the Church, that attempt to have the sanctions without the reality, to which Humanism is the theological parallel. Believers in the kingdom of God were pioneers in the planning of national and international life. The old politicians were often content to be opportunists. Christians reminded them that there were ideals and principles. It was never possible for the Christians to describe exactly what they desired to bring about—that was always beyond the power of words. It could



be glimpsed in a vision and described in symbols, but there was no possibility of an advance photograph. It existed in the purpose of God, and would be elicited by obedience to the quickening Spirit. What has now happened is that politicians have attempted to borrow spiritual principles and are using them in a wooden way. For vision there is invention, and for the symbols which touched truth there is a man-made mythology which supplants it. The motto is: "As in earth, so in heaven."

To brandish the indiscriminate slogans of sheer nationalism is like opening a conference with a crowbar, or measuring art with a foot-rule. The Church Congress programme is based on the double belief that there are better ways of resolving human problems, and that the Eternal Mind holds the best and the only true solution. It will be supposed by many that "Christianity in the Modern World" is a panic subject, and means, "How can Christianity survive in the modern world?" In fact, it implies that the modern world's one chance of survival is to learn from the Church the principles of the Christian way of life, and to allow itself to be reconstructed according to that way.

The programme of the Modern Churchmen's Conference is always interesting, though, till the full text of what was said is published, we are rather at the mercy of what the reporters, apt to be the victims of conventional classification, assume to have been the meaning of the speakers. The new President, the Dean of St. Paul's, bravely set himself to emancipate the Union from what has been an unfortunate and really quite unnecessary limitation. There is not any reason why a union of "Modern Churchmen," or of "Modernists," should be solely of the Liberal Protestant type. In fact, a title which includes the word "Churchmen" might fairly be supposed to intend positively to emphasize the Catholic ideas of solidarity and continuity. And as for the word "Modernist," there are, historically speaking, overwhelming reasons for investing it with a Catholic connotation. At all events Dr. Matthews is eager for a policy of comprehension. There are so many today who either deny or forget the relevance and bindingness of the eternal principles, that "those who fear the Lord" must "look one upon another," not to compare melancholy notes, but for mutual encouragement and co-operation. As Figgis said, "Those who have any hold on the supernatural are being driven closer together by the pressure of events." To this diagnosis he added, "Not always with their own good will." That was some five and twenty years ago. Today whatever reluctance there may have



been is disappearing, and even though an appeal to "the supernatural" might cause a mild sensation at a Girton Conference, that is only one more example of the unfortunate tyranny of labels. There are not a few simple souls among the Modernists about whom we are tempted to borrow and adapt what Disraeli said of his wife, "They are the best of creatures, but they never can remember the difference between the supernatural and the superstitious." The meaning of the term "supernatural" needs to be carefully examined, and the virtue recognized in it by Von Hügel and Dr. Oman needs to be more clearly understood. The results of such a process would be satisfactory. The *hoplitai* are apt to dwell on the deficiencies of the more lightly armed *peltastai*, and there is indeed a difference. But they are both on the same side of the line which divides the armed from those who face evil with only the bare hands of a humanist or naturalist equipment. There is a vast difference between those who appeal to "the Gospel of Christ" and those who have nothing but what they create themselves. Supernatural is a convenient term, and as we think, a necessary term. But no one term is ever permanently necessary. If any group of Christians have some other term or terms for the same thing, in God's name let them use it, and advance with us. We are not likely to agree at all points over so great a thing as the meaning of the Christian religion. Some claims we must make, and face the charges of smugness and complacency which will certainly be launched. We must believe ourselves more right than others; else there would be no defence for standing where we do. But if ever the claim is made to possess the whole truth, to be so verily "the people," as Job wittily expressed it, that wisdom is like to die with us, then follows, swift and inevitable, the verdict that "whatever else is true, that certainly is false." That claim must always be repudiated, and when there are signs that Liberals are becoming really liberal, then more than ever Catholics must be really catholic.

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In the August number it was stated that Father Bolton's *A Catholic Memorial of Lord Halifax and Cardinal Mercier* was published without an *Imprimatur*. The author assures us that in the publication of his book all the requirements of Canon Law were satisfied, and that he would not have proceeded to publish in defiance of these requirements. We heartily apologize for having given the wrong impression. The book is said on the title-page to be *cum approbatione ecclesiastica*.

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## ANGLICANISM

### I

THE future historian of the English Church will find in the years that followed the Great War much to engage his attention, for it has been a period of remarkably vigorous development on many sides. Probably the most important, because the most fundamental, gain has come from the strikingly able work done during these years in the rediscovery of the Gospel and the intellectual presentation of the Faith. Anglican scholars, theologians, and philosophers have taken a prominent part in that great reawakening of Christian thought which is one of the marks of our time. If we look gratefully outside our own Communion to the inspiration and stimulus of von Hügel, Maritain, Berdyaev, Barth, Brunner, and many another, we can put side by side with their writings Anglican contributions to New Testament study, philosophical theology, dogmatics, ascetic and moral theology, quite excellent in their learning, critical candour, and power of constructive thought. The world outside the Church, even the educated world, shews astonishing ignorance of what the Church has to say; and even within the Church what is being done is not yet widely enough appreciated, though every year sees a more fruitful understanding among clergy and laity of the rediscovered riches of the Faith. But of the fine achievements of Christian thought and scholarship, not least in Anglicanism, since the war, no one who has kept in touch with the literature can have any doubt.

When the story comes to be told, it will be surprising if a special meed of honour is not given to S.P.C.K. The venerable society, under the guidance of its editorial secretary, Dr. Lowther Clarke, has done signal service to the Church by providing and organizing opportunities for the new knowledge and the new apologetic to express themselves. The year 1920 was memorable for many reasons in Anglican history: it saw the first meeting of the Church Assembly, the first Archbishop of Wales, the first Anglo-Catholic Congress, and the great Lambeth Conference which issued the "Appeal to all Christian People." It also saw the beginning of *THEOLOGY*, which Dr. Selwyn and Dr. Lowther Clarke made a mouthpiece of Anglican scholarship. This journal has been to many students a constant stimulus and refreshment, and one such claims the right here and now to testify to his deep sense of gratitude to it. From the fellowship of theologians which grew up round Dr. Selwyn came in 1926 *Essays Catholic and Critical*, a landmark in Anglican theology and the first large-scale pronouncement since *Lux Mundi* of



that soberly critical orthodoxy which is the special mark of Anglicanism and finds so congenial a home in the English Church. In 1932 Dr. Lowther Clarke published *Liturgy and Worship*, a companion work giving the religious practice of Anglicanism, as *Essays Catholic and Critical* had expounded its theology. The *New Commentary* and *Northern Catholicism* belong to the same movement. Now in *Anglicanism*, edited by Dr. Elmer More and Dr. F. L. Cross, S.P.C.K. has added another volume, equally notable, which will be invaluable for the understanding of the Anglican position.\*

## II

This monumental work comes opportunely. The vigorous theological movement just referred to is often called liberal Catholicism, and the epithets Catholic and critical describe its aim and character. To many of us nothing within the generous limits of the Anglican Communion contains so wide a measure of truth, and at the same time is so faithful to the Anglican genius and mission. As critical, it is alive to all the contemporary work on the New Testament foundations of the Faith, and incorporates much that earlier generations of Anglicans never contemplated: if we take even Dr. Plummer's commentary on St. Luke or Dr. Swete's on St. Mark—comparatively recent pieces of Anglican scholarship—and compare them, say, with Dr. Rawlinson's Westminster commentary on St. Mark, we are conscious of far-reaching changes. The same would be true if we were to take our examples from a somewhat different type of Anglicanism and adduce Professor Creed's St. Luke or Professor Lightfoot's Bampton. Whatever we may think of the particular examples quoted, it is certain that contemporary Anglicanism is not blind or obscurantist in face of modern critical study; and it has in fact gone to school with the critics and learnt much from them. But Catholicism and criticism are sometimes held to be incompatible, and the question of our continuity with a pre-critical age must be faced. Is there such a thing as Anglicanism? And what of its orthodoxy, its claim to be Catholic as well as critical? Does it keep the Faith, or is our liberal Anglican Catholicism what many Roman Catholic controversialists and some conservative Anglicans say it is—a ceremonialist modernism, neither orthodox in theology nor truly Catholic in temper? Is it even in line with the classical exponents of Anglicanism, the seventeenth-century High Churchmen?

Here Dr. Elmer More and Dr. Cross provide us with abundant material for an answer. This admirably edited book, over eight

\* *Anglicanism*. Edited by Dr. Paul Elmer More and Dr. Frank Leslie Cross. S.P.C.K. 21s.



hundred pages in length, contains three hundred and sixty-two passages, sorted into nineteen groups, from the religious literature of the period 1594 to 1691. To explain their purpose, the editors quote from Newman's *Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church* (1837): "We have a vast inheritance, but no inventory of our treasures. All is given in profusion; it remains for us to catalogue, sort, distribute, select, harmonize, and complete." It is a large task, and it has been very ably performed. Both for quantity and quality the book is, and must long remain, an indispensable work of reference and a source of literary as well as of theological treasure. For the magnificent prose is as satisfying to literary taste as the matter is absorbing to the student of theology. The formidable bulk of the theological and controversial writings of the seventeenth century makes it a practical impossibility for any but the specialist in that field to get a working knowledge of what they contain. The Church owes a debt of gratitude to Dr. Elmer More and Dr. Cross for the immense labour they must have expended in order to make this finely representative collection.

The book is prefaced by two valuable essays, one on the "Spirit of Anglicanism" by Dr. Elmer More, and the other an historical survey by Mr. F. R. Arnott, "Anglicanism in the Seventeenth Century." Dr. Elmer More's essay is admirable in its sensitive appreciation and insight. He points out that the Anglicanism of the seventeenth century, when the English Church shook itself free from the entanglements which threatened to turn it into "a mere echo of the radical Protestantism of the Continent," and came to the knowledge of itself and of its true place and mission in Christendom, showed considerable diversity of opinion on points of doctrine and discipline. There is no one theologian exalted to the place occupied by Luther and Calvin in foreign Protestantism, nor is there anything in Anglicanism comparable to the decrees of the Council of Trent in the Church of Rome: the Thirty-Nine Articles have no such authority. Hence what we have to look for is "not so much finality as direction." There was no premature fixation of Anglican theology, no strait-waistcoat in which all subsequent Anglican theology must walk: but there was a "steady flow of the current beneath all surface eddies towards a definite goal."

The Anglican way was the *via media*, which was no way of compromise, no "halting betwixt two opinions, when the thorough-believing of one of them is necessary to salvation" (Fuller), but a positive ideal of Christian theology. As Charles Gore used to teach, and as Dr. Elmer More also points out, it is best exemplified by the Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation. Anglicanism is often mocked as a half-way house between the



"logical" positions of Rome on the one hand and Geneva on the other. So the Arian pressed his "logic" in face of the paradoxical comprehensiveness of Catholic teaching, which took shape in the Chalcedonian doctrine of the Two Natures. Actually the so-called logic was the *bad* logic of a conclusion from insufficient data, the logic, so tiresomely familiar in many fields of thought, of those who to get a neat and tidy conclusion leave out part of what is to be explained. The Anglican theologians of the seventeenth century believed firmly in the ideal of balance, moderation, measure, as the dominant and regulative principles in dealing with the mysteries of faith. And it was in the proper sense a logical belief. They were lovers of reason, and they saw that the principle of measure, congenial to Greek as to English thought, was necessary to save reason from degenerating into an over-simplified distortion of the complexity and the mystery of divine truth.

Dr. Elmer More shows how this principle of the mean expressed itself in two forms—the distinction between fundamentals and accessories, and the rejection of all claims to infallibility. The seventeenth-century divines held that the things necessary for salvation are few, are clearly stated in Scripture, and are summed up conveniently in the Creeds. So they rejected the dogmatic innovations which Rome, on her own authority as the infallible interpreter of tradition, sought to make *de fide*, and counted them unscriptural and, therefore, if not false, unessential. Yet tradition, especially in matters of religious observance, the *lex orandi*, was not to be rejected in the wholesale fashion of the Puritans, simply because specific warrant for this or that practice was lacking in Scripture. The true continuity and the true Catholicism lay with neither extreme, but in using tradition not as equal to Scripture nor yet as hostile to Scripture, but as a guide: for tradition, when it is not allowed to add to the necessities for salvation, is to be respected and cherished as incorporating the wisdom of accumulated human experience. With that limitation they would follow tradition, as against Rome, which created rather than obeyed tradition, and also against Geneva, which failed to recognize its immense value.

Closely connected with this insistence on the right balance between the two regulative forces, Scripture and Tradition, and on the fewness of the things necessary for salvation, is the rejection of the infallibility of any "created thing." "Two things there are which trouble greatly these later times: one that the Church of Rome cannot, another that Geneva will not, err" (Hooker). The Anglican divines did not for a moment doubt the certainty of those truths which are "necessary for salva-



tion," or the infallibility of the Church in proclaiming those truths. But they rejected the idea of an oracular organ of infallibility among men which could pronounce that out of all the possible or probable inferences drawn by tradition or reason from those truths this or that doctrine is part of the essential deposit of faith. The saving revelation is plainly and sufficiently set forth in the Bible story of the birth, life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, and is conveniently summarized in the Apostles' Creed. The Primitive Church, General Councils, the Fathers, Tradition generally, are valuable and indispensable guides to the interpretation of revealed truths. Beyond these positions they refused to go, whether by addition, with Rome, or by diminution, with the radical Protestants.

### III

If these, or something like them, are the principles underlying the formative work of the great Caroline theologians of Anglicanism, the interesting question of the essential continuity between these High Churchmen of the past and the liberal Catholics of today must be answered in the light of Dr. Elmer More's canon, "not so much finality as direction." Precisely identical formulæ on all subjects are neither desirable in themselves nor do they provide the only or the best kind of continuity. Actually we find obvious differences, which at first sight might seem incompatibilities. Two kinds of differences, in particular, suggest themselves.

The first—and Dr. Elmer More deals with it, though in somewhat gingerly fashion—is the changed estimate of the inspiration of Scripture, and the sense in which we affirm that Scripture is the Rule of Faith. The critical approach to Scripture, which we take for granted today, can hardly be said to have been adopted by Anglicanism before *Lux Mundi*: and from *Lux Mundi* to *The Riddle of the New Testament* is a fairly long step. Yet there are certain features of the older Anglican use of Scripture which point the way to the far more profitable and secure use of it by modern Anglican scholars in the light of over a hundred years of historical and critical study of the Bible. The Caroline rejection of infallibility was not, we may presume, extended to the Scriptures; but the stress on the few essentials of faith, the large liberty apart from these essentials, the rejection of the slavish bibliolatry of the Puritans, leave the road clear for the further development of modern Anglicanism in rejecting the idea of the "infallible book." The authentic spirit of Anglicanism, true to its *via media*, is clearly manifest in our times. It has avoided, on the one hand, the obscurantist rigorism



common to the Vatican Commission and to fundamentalist Protestantism and, on the other, the failure of liberal Protestantism to retain the dogmatic essentials of the historic Christian religion. Nowhere is this plainer than in the literature of the liberal Catholic movement of our time from Gore to the present day. It is impossible not to think that if a representative Caroline divine were placed in the circumstances of our time he would recognize the activity of the same spirit as moved in the Anglicanism of his days.

The other difference, equally important, affects not the Biblical basis of doctrine but the structure of doctrine and practice characteristic of Anglicanism in its seventeenth- and in its twentieth-century forms. It may be said at once that in all the fundamentals of the Faith these documents reveal no material difference. Common to both ages are the authority of the Catholic Creeds and the first four General Councils, the sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharist, the Apostolic Succession through the Bishops, the desire to abide in the Catholic and Apostolic Faith of the ancient undivided Church. But the stress of the controversy with Rome, which rings incessantly through the writings of the seventeenth-century divines, affected many secondary positions in ways which we should want to modify today.

There is the question of the appeal to Antiquity. We could hardly say today, with Simon Patrick, that "the Religion of the Church of England, by Law established, is the true Primitive Christianity; in nothing new, unless it be in rejecting all that novelty which hath been brought into the Church." That doughty upholder of the "virtuous mediocrity" of the Church of England against "the meretricious gaudiness of the Church of Rome and the squalid sluttishness of fanatic conventicles" was less restrained in his language than many of his fellow-divines. But undoubtedly there was a general tendency to see the early Church through very rosy spectacles when it suited controversial purposes to wear them, and unhistorical comparisons were made between the Church of England and the primitive Church. The whole appeal to Antiquity is driven rather too hard by seventeenth-century Anglicanism. It was a very necessary appeal, in view of the papal innovations and the violent reaction of the Puritans against the past. In its essence it is still necessary, for if we appreciate development better today, we must still, as believers in the Holy Spirit's guidance of the Church, recognize as normative the age in which the Great Church, before the division of East and West, shaped the Canon, the Creed, and the Episcopate. But the conception of a primitive kernel of irreproachable apostolic Catholicism, recovered in its pristine purity by the Church of England after the mediæval accretions had



been stripped off, is rather too simple. It needs to be corrected by a more dynamic, less static, idea, such as the modern concept of development, when carefully used, can be made to provide. We may add that the dynamic Holy-Spirit theology of certain teachers of the Orthodox Church has important lessons for the Anglican Church, no less than for the Roman.

Other examples of the way in which the Roman controversy had results which seem unfortunately cramping can be found in the passages quoted to illustrate the seventeenth-century doctrines of priesthood, the number of the sacraments, purgatory, and prayers for the dead. On all these points one has an uncomfortable feeling that reaction against Popery unduly affected the judgment of many Anglicans of the time. The doctrine of the eucharistic sacrifice is nobly and beautifully taught by Jeremy Taylor, John Bramhall, and Lancelot Andrewes, yet there is a curious hedging about the word "priest" in their predecessor Hooker, as is well known, and in other writers. The reason seems to be that the doctrine of sacrifice, so vital to Christianity, had not been worked out. The sacrificing priest (*sacerdos*) was so closely associated with perversions alleged, rightly or wrongly, against current Romanism that the name of priest was felt to imply these perversions. Bramhall, for instance, speaks of the Roman Mass as "another Propitiatory Sacrifice" distinct from the Sacrifice of the Cross. In that sense, as Joseph Mede puts it, "our curates of holy things in the Gospel are not to offer sacrifice, and therefore ought not to be called *Sacerdotes*." But it would have been much more to the point if Hooker and others, instead of feebly defending the word "priest" under cover of the more respectable "presbyter," had boldly claimed for the ministerial priesthood of the Church that most real and most vital work of sacrifice which it is theirs to do. Positive teaching about spiritual realities suffered owing to the bane of controversy, even to the point of inconsistency. For the doctrine of the eucharistic sacrifice common in the Caroline divines cries out for a deep and spiritual doctrine of priesthood, and of priests who are more than the "fatherly guides" of the well-known passage in Hooker.

The question of the number of the sacraments, two or seven, is a comparatively small one. Richard Baxter, in a very sensible passage quoted by our editors, notes that the word "sacrament" is a "word that will stretch." In the opinion of Lancelot Andrewes the matter is a mere quarrel about words. But it is nevertheless to be regretted that for the most part the five lesser sacraments were left so vague in their status, and, as it were, under the cloud with which the muddled and ungrammatical passage in the twenty-fifth Article of Religion had darkened



counsel. A sacramental philosophy such as is implied in Anglicanism demands a clearer and firmer conception of the essentially sacramental quality of the acts of ordination, confirmation, absolution, and unction; and the sacramental view of marriage is today seen to be implied in the Christian objection to the idea of marriage as a terminable contract of a simply legal kind. The greater readiness of present-day Anglo-Catholicism to value the seven sacraments is more than a concession to Roman ways: it is due to a more intelligent application of the sacramental principle. It was mainly the heat and dust of the strife with Rome which obscured the deeper issues involved.

Eschatological doctrine suffered in the same way. The specifically Roman doctrine of purgatory and the treasury of merits ("a kind of poor man's box") was indignantly repudiated, but our editors can find little coherent teaching to quote on the intermediate state. William Wake, Jeremy Taylor, and Herbert Thorndike are quoted on purgatory and prayers for the dead, but the first two are mainly concerned to denounce Romish error, and Archbishop Wake seems to lean to the view that all who depart this life go immediately to heaven or hell. Thorndike, while rejecting any doctrine that a departed soul can be prayed out of purgatory-pains into perfect happiness, adumbrates a sound doctrine of prayers for the dead; but his is the one passage in which the writer is not mainly negative and only too eager to scarify Popery. We find no Anglican equivalent to the nobly tender doctrine of the *Dream of Gerontius*.

#### IV

In these and other matters there has been change and, we may believe, improvement. If all variation on the periphery of doctrine or even in the estimate of the nature of Biblical authority is to be counted a mark of a false church, cut off from the Body of Christ, then the Anglican Church must stand condemned. But it must be said that, if so, every other church in Christendom falls with it. For nowhere is exact identity of doctrine to be found from the first days until now, and least of all in the churches of the Roman obedience. The strength of Anglicanism lies in the fact that, when it frankly and of set purpose admits the fewness of the essentials and the possibility of erring in the interpretation of the inferences to be drawn from them, it preserves liberty as well as authority. And it sees that consistency in positive doctrine does not mean a cast-iron system imposed by one age on all subsequent ages. No dogmatic system is stronger than its weakest link. Lutheranism and Calvinism, as systems, have collapsed. Rome maintains her pretensions to identity of doctrine and to inerrancy only by



intellectual gymnastics more ingenious than ingenuous. *Non tali auxilio nec defensoribus istis* seems to be the lesson of experience; and we may without complacency be grateful that Anglicanism is not a doctrinal gramophone reiterating in every syllable the decrees of the past. The main impression left after reading the book under review is that these men are breathing a more wholesome air than their adversaries and have their feet on firmer ground. They unite a strong and positive faith with a reticence that leaves the mind elbow-room. They have found the way to combine authority and freedom, reverence for the past and reasoned criticism of the past, supernaturalism and commonsense. They can be balanced and moderate without shilly-shallying, dogmatic without oppression, liberal and tolerant without losing their grip on strong positive doctrine. Doubtless they and their doctrines are faulty: that is only to say that they are men. They are awkward and uncertain at times, and they suffer from the fevers of a controversial approach to divine Truth. But how much more obvious is their noble gravity of mind, their desire for truth, their reverent and massive scholarship consecrated to an exalted ideal of intellectual integrity! It is certain that under the providence of God these things will have their part in the restoration of all things in Christ. "Anglicanism," says Dr. Elmer More, "will never become formally the religion of the world, nor has Canterbury any ambition to usurp the place claimed by Rome; but there is reason to believe that a liberal *ethos* of Christianity, resembling that developed by Englishmen in their clear-eyed opposition to the pseudo-antiquity of the Reformation and to the tenacious mediævalism of the Counter-Reformation, will more and more prevail in the Holy Catholic Church."

It is by following this line of thought that it is possible to see beneath the surface differences the strong bonds, both of dogmatic affirmation on essentials and of spiritual *ethos* in the method of approaching the mysteries of the Faith, which unite the High Churchmen of the seventeenth century to the liberal Catholic school of today. It follows that Anglicanism is no piece of insular compromise, indefensible in reason, another bit of English "muddling through." It is a vision of the Catholic Faith and the Catholic Church richer in its potentialities than any other. The Church of the future will need the strong sense of supernatural authority and the visible centre of Christendom which Rome holds in trust. It will need also the mystical spirituality of the East to deepen the rationalism of Western theology. The Church of England can welcome both with a grateful acknowledgment of her need; but she too has her trust, and it is no whit less than theirs.

H. BALMFORTH.



## THE EUCHARIST IN CHRISTIAN HISTORY AND WORSHIP

### I

I MAY perhaps assume that the title of my subject is to be taken as a hendiadys, that the Christian history which it intends is, if not exclusively, at least pre-eminently, the history of Christian devotion. The significant feature of every religion is its worship. And worship is significant because it reflects unerringly as in a mirror all the other features of a given religion, its doctrine, its discipline, and above all those distinctive but not easily definable characteristics which we call inclusively its ethos. On the other hand, there is not always an exact parallelism between changes of form in worship and development of doctrine, so that a merely descriptive history of the one need have very little correspondence with a merely descriptive history of the other. Indeed, variety in the forms of worship usually synchronizes with uniformity of doctrine and is possible just because of that uniformity, while variety of doctrinal interpretation provokes almost inevitably the imposition of uniformity in worship. Liturgiology draws practically all its material from a period when the sole test of the validity of doctrine was prescription, the "*quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*" of the Vincentian Canon. But when, with the Reformation theologies, prescription ceased to be a sufficient test even in the Roman Schools, the balance was at once redressed by the universal imposition of the Clementine liturgy in the sphere of worship. In other words, the earlier period of Christian history represented a body of doctrine which, because it was held to have a single legitimate interpretation, could express itself freely in a variety of liturgical forms. In the later period prescription in the field of worship was, more or less consciously, utilized as a means of preventing a certain unavoidable liberty of doctrinal interpretation from degenerating into destructive license.

It is in this way, then, that Christian history is the continuous interaction of doctrine and worship. But Christian history has a still further meaning. Neither Christian doctrine nor Christian devotion exists nor does their interaction take place within a fully responsive environment. They cannot even evoke response from the world in which they have appeared. For that world is the construction of fallen man. It is not the real world, the world in itself, but a world of appearance created by the morally diseased spirit of man. Christian doctrine, Christian



worship, are alike representations, effectual symbols, of the gracious Divine power, the free gift of Divine grace, which re-creates the spirit of man so that it can see and know, act upon and be acted upon by, the real world of the original Divine creative act. Every existent in that real world is an expression of some aspect of the Divine perfection, and can be known as such by those who are reborn through the Divine mysteries. Even in the natural unregenerate man there remains some faint power of perceiving these traces of Divine perfection in the world of the senses and of inferring from them at least the truth of the Divine existence. But all true knowledge of that actual world presented to sense is either an immediate deduction from the truths of Revelation or, if obtained by sensible observation, must be capable of being reduced to those truths. Equally, of course, all action of redeemed humanity upon the world, all rule and government, is for this view the application to the ordered life of the Christian Republic of the revealed Law of God. This, then, was the original conception of Christendom, an actual concrete hierarchy of Divine truth and Divine authority in the world of redeemed humanity and constituting that world, as distinguished from Christianity considered as an abstract system of religious truth. The distinction did not, of course, then exist, as no one then thought of Christianity as an abstract system. But it is significant that, when this distinction did arise, the most perfect instrument of clear distinction in thought known to Western humanity, the French language, could not tolerate the use of the same word for things so disparate. For the one was reserved the warm traditional name, rich in its concrete historical associations, "la chrétienté": for the other was coined the cold technical term "le christianisme," an *ism* just like any other.

But the fact for which our word Christendom originally stood was not of long continuance. Even under its aspect of theocracy it did not effectually survive the inglorious triumph of Philip the Fair over Boniface VIII. at the beginning of the fourteenth century. In theory, indeed, the traditional conception of Christendom was but slightly modified by the imprisonment and death of the Pope who had just in the Bull *Unam Sanctam* enforced that conception in its most intransigent form as authoritative. The imperial theologians might preach the doctrine of the two swords, might contend for the recognition of a natural division between the spiritual and the temporal spheres of authority. Even when, nearly three centuries later, the Empire had lost all its prestige, so orthodox a theologian as Suarez could appear as the champion of the sovereign rights of the civil ruler where that ruler was his Most Catholic Majesty



of Spain. But these apparent aberrations were possible only because the theory of the single Divine authority, the authority of the same Divine Law applied to different spheres of administration, still remained intact. *In fact*, of course, and long before Suarez' time, it was otherwise. Nationalism had, *in fact*, long since prevailed against the shadowy Empire, but, what was much more disastrously significant, it had also found its theory in the *real-politik* of Machiavelli. Christendom henceforth survived only through the slender link with its majestic past of the Law of Nations, of which Suarez, to his honour, was also the great sixteenth-century prophet.

But the Christendom which I am here attempting to describe as the ideal framework of the Christian life had, on its intellectual side also, suffered serious mutilation. Albert the Great and St. Thomas had been the first of the Schoolmen to proclaim the autonomy of secular philosophy. They recognized, that is to say, in the human reason the power of attaining to a necessary and certain knowledge of truths not given in revelation, and quite independently of its data. This obviously opened the way for that explanation of the world of nature which the secular sciences were to undertake as soon as they had discovered the method appropriate to each field of enquiry. But this result was still distant. The more immediate result was in the field of theology. The pre-Thomist Schoolmen from Anselm to Bonaventure had held that all the truths of Revelation were within the competence of the human reason. Even the supreme mystery of the Trinity had, in fact, been dimly perceived by the Platonists. And even if the reason had not of itself attained to the knowledge of some revealed truth, it was still capable of establishing the reasonableness of that truth once it had been revealed. But St. Thomas, with his clearer grasp of rational method, and therefore of its limits, definitely excluded from all competence of reason the knowledge of such truths as the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Eucharist. Even when these truths had been revealed, the most the reason could do was to find some distant analogies which could yet contribute nothing to real knowledge of them. Meanwhile, it is true, St. Thomas himself applied the autonomous reason to the elucidation and defence of truths such as the Divine existence and attributes with a systematic thoroughness never known before. But with the growing degradation of philosophy in the Nominalism of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, it lost all faith in itself as an interpreter of the mysteries of faith. Theology degenerated into a mere fideism, which means in the long run a sheer scepticism.



## II

Now my only possible excuse for detaining you so long with this most imperfect sketch of an historical background is my belief, which you may not share, that no religious doctrine, no form of religious worship, and no interpenetration of the two, can in their actual development be understood without continual reference to that background. In the case of any single doctrine it may be difficult to exhibit this dependence with any sufficient clearness. Indeed, I think it would be impossible to do so if the attempt were made to treat the doctrine in isolation from the whole body of doctrine of which it is a living member. But the difficulty is certainly alleviated in the case of the doctrine of the Eucharist because, by the variety of its implications, it takes us to the heart of Christian doctrine and keeps us there. That variety is at once witnessed to by the names which have been used to describe it: The Lord's Supper (*Coena Domini*), The Lord's Table (*Mensa Domini*), The Lord's Body (*Corpus Domini*), Sanctissimum (The Holy of Holies), Eucharist or Thanksgiving, the Eulogia or Blessing, the Agape or Love Feast, the *Fractio Panis* or Breaking of Bread, the Synaxis or Assembly. These are all titles of the first Christian ages. St. Augustine called somewhat belated attention to its character as a sacrament in calling it the Blessed Sacrament of the Altar. The special significance of our own Holy Communion also recalls a favourite teaching of Augustine. Finally, there is the title of the Mass, whose associations derive entirely from its long-continued popular use, and not like the others from any intrinsic meaning of the word itself. Now what is most strange about this variety of names is that so many of them seem to have little or no connection with the specific commemoration of the rite. That is not, of course, because the act commemorated is not always in the forefront of devotional intention, but because of itself it evokes and authorizes so many different modes and moods of devotion. For us the Eucharist is one of the recognized sacraments of the Christian Church, and the word sacrament itself has a very definite meaning. For the Church of the first centuries the word sacrament was only being acclimatized gradually in a Christian atmosphere, and Baptism and the Eucharist were linked together rather as the Divine Mysteries which admitted to the fulness of eternal life. Again, the Eucharist was the supreme, the ineffable Mystery in a sense that even Baptism was not, since to it alone, perhaps, the Discipline of the Secret fully applied. The Eucharist was the actual miraculous presence of the wholeness of the life of the Risen and Ascended Christ in and to the community



which He had founded. That community was itself the *corpus mysticum*, the mystical body of which Christ was the Head, the sole animating principle. It had no life but the life which it derived from Him. Hence Augustine's strange identification of the Eucharist with the Church regarded as the *corpus mysticum*. Baptism was the original impartation of that Divine life. The Eucharist was its continual Divine nourishment. But this life, whether as first imparted or as continually renewed, was the life of the Incarnate Christ offering itself as a perfect fulfilment of the Father's will of righteousness for sinful man. The members of the mystical body were true members only in so far as they united themselves in deed and truth with that offering. And they could so unite themselves because the life which they possessed was both in its generation and in its continued sustenance one with the life of Divine self-oblation. It is in some such way, perhaps, that we may best understand Augustine's peculiar identification of the Eucharist with the *corpus mysticum*. But I think we may go further and surmise that Augustine is here only giving clearer expression to a conception of the Eucharist which had been confusedly present to the minds of Christians from the beginning. Christ was present in the community in its every act, and especially in that supreme act of worship as a community which recalled the atoning Death and Passion and continued their efficacy. Each actual assembly of the local community, each *synaxis*, was a renewal of the redemptive activity of Christ as the sole life of the one *corpus mysticum*. His presence in that body was real, continuous, permanent. But the clearest manifestation of that presence was in the Breaking of the Bread. There the mystical body of the Lord offered itself again as His natural body had offered itself on Calvary, and in that offering all its members partook of the Bread from Heaven and drank of the fruit of the heavenly Vine.

But side by side with this intense realism there persisted also the special symbolism which made the Eucharist a definite rite. Already in the *Didache* the contrast between the symbol and the reality symbolized is elaborately drawn out, and the reality again is described in its effects. What we would now call the *res sacramenti*, the reality of the sacrament, is found in the closer communion of all the members of the body through their renewed participation in the life of its Head. But it is St. Augustine again who first clearly insists on what is involved in the conception of the Eucharist as a sacrament. For him the distinction between the symbol and the thing symbolized is fundamental. And it is just that distinction which constitutes a sacrament. It is not that he thinks of a symbol as something



arbitrary, as something out of all real relation with the reality it symbolizes. On the contrary, a symbol is for him a symbol because in some real sense it contains its reality, because the reality is present in it seeking expression through it. All nature was for him a symbolism of Divine realities. But the difference between symbol and reality was still more important than their coexistence. The symbol was after all the thing seen. The reality was invisible save to the eye of faith. And faith was not just the easily accepted belief that some reality was there, even that some definite reality whose presence and specific character were certified by sufficient authority was there. Faith was, on the contrary, the hardly-won living apprehension of a particular reality, the assured and fully vital appropriation of it. With this mode and temper of approach it was inevitable that Augustine should find the *res sacramenti* of the Eucharist in nothing less than the fulness of its effect, in what he called, as did Calvin later, its *virtus*. Everything short of that was still *signum*. Indeed, his favourite distinction was between *caro* and *spiritus*. It is the spirit of Christ which in the Eucharist gives life, the spirit which can be received by spirit and as spirit, life kindling life. There is much in the *ex professo* treatment of the Eucharist by Augustine which justifies the assertion of Loofs and Harnack that his doctrine is not even Calvinist but frankly Zwinglian. But in so far as that is true it serves to redeem the doctrine of Zwingli from the contempt with which Catholic theology has visited it. And, of course, we must remember that we share that contempt, as most Roman writers upon the Eucharist describe the teaching of our own Articles as Zwinglian.

All the great Eucharistic controversies date from Augustine and are already latent in his teaching. Into those controversies I do not mean to enter further than to say that they centre around three main points, the reality, the totality, and the permanence of Christ's presence in the Eucharist. By the reality of the presence is meant the presence upon the altar of the substance of that same body in which our Lord tabernacled on earth and which now exists in a glorified mode in heaven, under the species or appearances of bread and wine. By the totality of the presence is meant that in every particle of the consecrated wafer, and of every consecrated wafer on every altar throughout the world, the same body exists without diminution or alteration of anything which made it that particular body. By the permanence of the presence is meant that the Eucharistic body is not confined in time to the moment of reception, but continues to exist for the adoration of the faithful until the accidents are corrupted. Further, the dis-



cussion of these questions is controlled by the dogmatic definition by the Fourth Lateran Council of the mode of the presence.

Now, I recall these questions only as illustrations of that intimate connection of devotion and doctrine of which I have spoken. The actual history of that connection deserves, I think, a more careful and detailed study than has yet been given to it. But I am inclined to think that it would reveal a very close dependence of doctrine upon devotion, and not of devotion upon doctrine. An objection to this view may at once be raised in the very obvious fact that devotion is nothing more than the outward expression of an antecedent belief. That is unquestionably true. But the belief out of which devotion arises, which expresses itself immediately in devotion, is not as yet defined. Not only does it feel no need of submitting itself to that process of the reason which is required to prepare definition, but it instinctively resents all use of reason as an alien invasion of its own sacred and peculiar territory. There may be, I think there always is, what we call sufficient reason behind the distinctively religious belief and behind every instance of it. But it, itself, is so possessed by the overwhelming consciousness of its own certainty that its one need is not formal but personal expression, not doctrine but devotion. It even communicates itself to others as and through devotion, as an infection, not an explanation. The time comes when explanation, too, is necessary, when those who are themselves possessed by the belief feel that they ought to be able to communicate to others the reason for the faith that is in them. It is then that belief passes beyond itself into doctrine, ceases to be merely personal certainty and becomes a formal teaching which may convey that same certainty to others, may enable them also to gain personal possession of it.

It might seem, then, that doctrine is necessarily a *reduction* of the original faith and of the devotion in which it is expressed. But that is by no means the case. Both belief and devotion need the correction and purification which only that clear and sustained thought about the content of the one and the object of the other which issues in doctrine can give. Both are prone to be very dangerous, all the more dangerous because unconscious, forms of self-engrossment from which it needs the severity of real thought to deliver them. The rule of faith, the *regula fidei*, is a necessary and fruitful stage in all religious development. Yet devotion is so much the very essence of religion that it will have the last word. Over and over again it has swept aside the restraints of doctrine and forced it to accommodate itself to the new situation which the urgency of its prerogative demands has created.



No better illustration of this process could be found than in the history of the Eucharist alike as doctrine and as devotion. From the first the Lord's presence with his people was most closely and intimately felt in the memorial of His Death and Passion. There He gave Himself, His own body and blood, to them. There they received Him, not only His Spirit, but His actual body and blood in the consecrated elements. The language was the language of devotion, all the more so in that it was a repetition of the Lord's own words in His institution of the great memorial. The earliest Fathers still used that language in a devotional setting and with its devotional significance only. Origen, Chrysostom, Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine, were the first to examine carefully what that language might mean and ought to mean even for devotion. We have seen how Augustine performed his task. The sacramental character of the rite was his guide. There was a sign which was a sign only, even though through it the *res sacramenti* was given and received. But the Augustinian doctrine had no effect on popular devotion, and even in the schools it had to accommodate itself to the realist conceptions of devotion. When in the eleventh century Berengar revived the main features of the Augustinian teaching, his theses were a mere outrage to universal Christian sentiment.

It was the rising tide of devotion which his theses provoked that forced a doctrinal statement of the presence in the Eucharist which made any further minimization of it impossible. And once the doctrine had been defined, devotion used it to reach still further triumphs. The vehement piety of St. Juliana of Liège procured from Urban IV. the institution of the Festival of Corpus Christi. There was little left for the schools but to defend philosophically the truths which devotion had decreed, the existence of accidents without a substance, the totality, the multilocality, the permanence of the presence, etc.

This unceasing activity of the Roman schools witnesses to a just sense of the need, and I may add the present difficulties, of religious apologetic. Every religion lives in a consistent world of its own, a world in which everything is recognized as proceeding from God and related to God, a world which is the total unfoldment of the Divine purpose. Christianity has with full consciousness been such a religion. It became such in the decisive rejection of the Marcionite lure and its retention of the Old Testament in its corpus of Sacred Scripture. Christianity did not begin with Christ, or rather it began with Christ because the same Christ had appeared in all the theophanies from Adam onwards as afterwards tabernacled continuously in Galilee for a certain space of years. The Church did not begin with



Christ, but had existed already in the synagogue. Even the sacraments of God's grace He had already instituted in Israel. Universal history was the unrolling of God's purpose which began with the Creation and ended with—the Last Things. History, therefore, as the *gesta Dei* was compact of miracle. Down to the end of the Middle Ages all Christians lived in such a world; all Christendom—for it was Christendom then—*was* such a world. The sense of religious awe, quite naturally and inevitably, found its object in every form and manifestation of life within that world. Divine and diabolic presences filled it or rather composed it. And the sense of religious awe extended to men's use of the commonest things of earth. Their sense of control over these things was always haunted by the guilt of ὕβρις, by the certainty of having to atone for even the appearance of an insolent assertion of independent right in them. None would have dared to sow or reap his fields or to set forth to gather the harvest of the sea without first imploring the Divine permission and assistance, without invoking the Divine blessing. For the inhabitants of such a world apologetic was not necessary. The business of the Christian thinker in it, even of the ordinary Christian teacher, was to impose some restraint of reason upon this wild exuberance of faith, or rather, perhaps I ought to say, to permeate its faith if possible with some leaven of reason.

Now, in contrast with all this, think of what has happened since the dawn of what we call the scientific era. Think, I mean, of the psychological results of our easy and assured control of all the forces of nature. Every householder is now a Prospero who commands an Ariel ready at his bidding to put a girdle round the earth in much less than forty minutes. Man has chained nature to his service and no longer stops even to wonder at it. Try to think of the man who controls the mechanism which transmits a voice in London to the furthest corners of the earth as haunted by the sense of ὕβρις, or of yourself as approaching the telephone to ring up a friend or a tradesman with a feeling of religious awe. This loss of wonder is having effects which are simply incalculable, and it is the busy multitudes of men who, as we say, have no time to think who are feeling the full force of those effects. The high priests of science, those who have made possible this familiar, almost truculent, use of nature's secrets, they and almost they alone now feel the wonder of those secrets. Theirs is coming to be perhaps the most effective protest against the dull materialism of the masses today.

Yet it is in this strangely refractory world that religion is once more renewing its power as man's instinctive protest



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### WAS ABELARD AN EXEMPLARIST?

THE belief that Abelard was an exemplarist is so thoroughly established that it scarcely seems necessary to give an illustrative quotation. But, to keep myself in order, let me give one, from J. G. Sikes' *Peter Abailard*, which is not only a recent publication, but is likely to remain the standard treatise on



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Abelard's theology for some time to come. He says, "Abelard . . . made exemplarism the centre of his doctrine." That is explicit, and fairly represents the opinion which has become traditional.

In order to show how far the tide of tradition has carried us from the facts, let us take an example from another author, again one who is enjoying an extensive vogue, though in a somewhat different sphere. Helen Waddell, in her *Medieval Lyrics*, gives a translation of one of Abelard's hymns for Good Friday. We may well take this particular hymn to be the expression of his most vital feelings on the subject, as it forms the spiritual climax of the set of hymns which he wrote for that occasion which would inevitably take him to the heart of the matter. It runs as follows:

Solus ad victimam procedis, Domine,  
Morti te offerens quam venis tollere,  
Quid nos miserrimmi possumus dicere,  
Qui, quæ commisimus, scimus te luere.

Nostra sunt, Domine, nostra sunt crimina:  
Quid tua criminum facis supplicia?  
Quibus sic compati fac nostra pectora,  
Ut vel compassio digna sit venia.

Nox ista flebilis præsensque triduum  
Quo demorabitur fletus sit vesperum,  
Donec lætitiæ mane gratissimum  
Surgente Domino sit mæstis redditum.

Tu tibi compati sic fac nos, Domine,  
Tuæ participes ut simus gloriæ;  
Sic præsens triduum in luctu ducere,  
Ut risum tribuas paschalis gratiæ.

Considered in its own light, this would be translated somewhat as follows: "Alone, O Lord, Thou goest forth to be the sacrifice, and offerest Thyself to that death which Thou comest to take away. What can we wretches say, who know that Thou undergoest the punishment, while we have done the wrongs? The offences are our own, our own indeed. Why dost Thou make their punishments Thine own? O make our hearts to share their pain, that our fellow-suffering may deserve to gain mercy. Let Thy sad night and all these whole three days be the night for which weeping endures, until the Lord rises and the happy morn of joy is granted to us who were in misery. Do Thou, O Lord, make us so to share Thy sufferings that we may be partakers of Thy glory. Cause us to spend these three days in such lamentation that Thou mayest bestow on us the smile of Easter grace."

A little consideration of this hymn will reveal the slope down which we have slipped away from Abelard's real meaning.



Thus, when we see the word "Victimam" in the first line, we are apt to think of the English word "Victim," which suggests no more than some kind of sufferer. But *Victima* was a specifically and exclusively religious term, the victim of a sacrifice. Therefore the occurrence of *Victima* in the very first line strikes the note of sacrifice, which is sustained throughout by the allied idea of our being identified with the Victim in His sufferings. But the real trouble arises just here. The feeling which I have tried to sum up in those last words can easily be missed altogether. It is expressed in the words *Compassio* and *Compati*. The obvious translation for *Compassio* is Compassion, which indeed Miss Waddell uses. But to do so is to ignore all that has befallen the word in the meantime. We think of Compassion as the sorrow which we feel for other people's sorrow. It is a derivative and detached feeling. An individualism, a separatism unknown to Abelard's mind and day has crept in. *Compassio* means, at least, fellow-suffering. It certainly would mean, not less, but perhaps rather more to Abelard. As Mr. Sikes points out, Abelard was very careful to define his words by their derivation. "Suffer with" (*compati*) is a long way from Miss Waddell's "Have pity." It may be—it may actually have been—that *Compati* came to be used in the milder sense of the English word. But, apparently, *Compassio* was not. And, in any case, the stronger meaning is required, not only because of Abelard's insistence on derivations, but also by the whole tenor of the hymn. What these lines require is more like the suffering, for which the word "sympathy" is wholly inadequate, of a mother when her child is ill. She forgets herself. She is possessed by the agony of the child, and whatever selfishness she may have had is purged away. Along these lines we can understand *Quibus sic compati fac nostra pectora, ut vel compassio digna sit venia*. If the suffering of Christ could so grip us, it would transform us. But, so far from suggesting that we can succeed in bringing this about by pondering or resolve, Abelard appeals to Christ to do it. That *fac* of his is emphatic: Make us to share Thy suffering. And it is to be noticed that in the last verse the *fac* is reinforced by the emphatic *tu*. This is all the more important because this last verse does not belong to this hymn only, but is repeated at the end of every member of the whole set of hymns.

Now Miss Waddell, approaching the hymn from the literary side, and, therefore, being unconsciously affected by the religious thought which writers have inherited, shows us how far we have travelled. For she not only uses the weakened word "compassion," but, being affected by its modern implications,



turns "Make our hearts so to share the suffering, that our fellow-suffering may be worthy to obtain mercy" into "Let our hearts suffer for Thy passion, Lord, that sheer compassion may Thy mercy win," and translates *Tu tibi compati fac nos* by "So may our hearts have pity on Thee." The whole force of the reiterated *fac* and the whole idea of Christ's action on us disappear. *Quid tua criminum facis supplicia*, "Why dost Thou make the punishment of the crime Thine own?" becomes "Why must Thou suffer torture for our sin?" Abelard is showing, or trying to show, a way in which sacrifice is made effective, but the thought of sacrifice is reduced to the merest shadow in Miss Waddell's translation. I am not saying this to disparage her work. We have every reason to be grateful to her for the services which she has rendered to the due valuation, not only of mediæval poets in general, but of Abelard's work and personality in particular. But her translation shows how a person who has not had occasion to think out the history of subsequent belief is carried away by a change of language which, oddly enough, both expresses and masks a strong and general current of thought.

Before leaving this hymn, there are two points which need to be brought out. First, the last line of the first verse, *Qui quæ commisimus scimus te luere*, makes it clear that Abelard believed that Christ is discharging the debt of punishment for us, and not merely putting up with it. This is, surely, at the very opposite pole to exemplarism. But more important is Abelard's treatment of the redeeming work of the suffering Christ as something which He is still carrying on. It is true that the object of this set of hymns was to enable the nuns of the Paraclete to live through the Crucifixion. But to live through it is very different from looking back on it. In the repeated refrain the period is referred to as *Præsens Triduum*, These Three Days, and, besides, the Sisters are bidden to look forward to Easter and not back on the actual day of the Resurrection. The effect of the hymns, as I have said, is to set their eyes on the suffering Christ as a present Person, taking definite action on them. Having regard to Abelard's history, I cannot but think that he is pointing out the road whereon he himself had been made repentant and found redemption. The hymn is real poetry, sprung from the heart of the writer's life, and not a mere academic exercise. Not but what Abelard could be chilly and academic on occasion. But here he is on fire with longing for the continuation of his Lord's action. Nor can I help thinking that it was the experience embodied in this hymn, or, if you prefer it, this trait of Abelard's mind which caused him to avoid, or even reject, the established transactional



theories, with their exclusive interest in the past. And herein, I believe, lay and still lies his immense importance.

Even when we examine the very extracts which are customarily adduced to prove that Abelard was an exemplarist, the same two ideas emerge, the Passion as a way in which Christ still displays Himself, and as a particular focussing of His personality on us by which He provokes a change in us. The first of the classical quotations, in the order in which Rashdall takes them, is thus translated by him: "Every man is also made\* juster, that is to say, becomes\* more loving to the Lord after the Passion of Christ, than he was before, because a benefit actually received *kindles*† the soul into love more than one merely hoped for. Our redemption, therefore, is that supreme love shown to us by His Passion, which not only *frees* us from slavery to sin, but *acquires* for us the true liberty of the sons of God, so that we fulfil all things, not so much from fear as from love of Him Who exhibited so great favour towards us, that favour than which, as He Himself attests, none greater can be found. 'Greater love,' He says, 'hath no man than this, that he lay down his life for his friends.'"

It is to be noted that in this very passage, which is adduced to show Abelard's exemplarism and subjectivity, he speaks of a "benefit actually received," as well as bringing in the remark about laying down his life for his friends. Surely these are curious ways of describing the setting of an example! But, besides, though Abelard speaks of our action, it is as the result of Christ's love, which kindles the soul, frees us from slavery, and acquires for us liberty. There simply is not room here for the intermediate action which has slipped into Rashdall's account, prefaced to this passage. Rashdall says, "The efficiency of Christ's death is now quite definitely and explicitly explained by its subjective influence upon the mind of the sinner. The voluntary death of the innocent Son of God on man's behalf moves the sinner to gratitude and answering love—and so to consciousness of sin, repentance, amendment." Rashdall was so absorbed in thinking of the change from substitutionary and expiatory theories that he did not grasp the fact that Abelard is speaking of a direct and not an indirect action. Furthermore, Rashdall (and here Mr. Sikes is carried away by the same tide) translates the second sentence as, "Our redemption, therefore, is that supreme love shown to us by

\* "Made" and "becomes" are both translations of the one word *fit*, once used, not repeated. The exact passage is *Iustior quoque, id est amplius diligens, quisque fit*. Why not translate *fit* as "is made" in both cases? Why give one word, once used, two meanings, the one obviously passive, while the other rather suggests an active? In any case, *fit* is present, not past. The thing is being done now.

† Italics mine.



His Passion." The original is *Redemptio itaque nostra est illa summa in nobis per passionem dilectio*. But this, surely, means, "Our redemption, therefore, is that supreme love which is *in us* through the Passion of Christ." The word "shown" has slipped in, possibly because *exhibitam* occurs lower down. "Shown," however, is an equivocal word, which, like others, causes confusion in Rashdall's thought. And even if *exhibita* has occurred here, the text would be *exhibita in nobis* (exhibited in us), and not *exhibita nobis* (exhibited to us). But I shall have to return to this point. Meanwhile, *redemptio est summa in nobis per passionem Christi dilectio* strikes quite a different note from exemplarism, a note which, I venture to say, is the key-note of Abelard's account of redemption. Love, to Abelard, was a spiritual force exerted by the lover on the beloved, and, in a responsive heart, setting up a reflex, which tends to become permanent. And Abelard knew what he was talking about. He was a great lover, who affected the lives of many besides Heloise, as he was, in turn, affected.

The second passage quoted by Rashdall would appear on the face of it to treat of redemption as a past transaction. But it, no less, speaks of something done to us ourselves. I will italicize the vital words as before. Rashdall's translation runs: "To us it appears that we are none the less justified by the blood of Christ and reconciled to God by this singular grace exhibited (*exhibitam*) to us in that His Son took our nature, and in it took on Himself to instruct us alike by word and example even unto death (and so) *bound* us to Himself by love: so that *kindled* by so great a benefit of divine grace, charity should not be afraid to endure anything for His sake: which benefit indeed, we do not doubt, *kindled* the ancient fathers also, who expected this by faith, unto a supreme love of God no less than the men of His time." Now, the fact of Abelard's believing the same effect to have been wrought on the Fathers shows that he is speaking of a continuous and characteristic effect, not confined to a transaction at a particular date in the first century A.D. (Is he not here approaching an idea which is sedulously avoided as a rule—that of the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world?) And, apart from missing the force of the words "kindled" and "bound," Rashdall seems to have twisted the meaning of the passage, though, no doubt, quite unconsciously. The bracketed words "and so" are an interpolation, so that the passage should read, "He bound us to Himself by love, so that kindled by so great a benefit," etc. What is more, in *Ipse nos tam verbo quam exemplo instituendo usque ad mortem præstitit* puts the emphasis on the endurance rather than the teaching, so that it should be read as, "He persisted even to



death in teaching," etc. And, although Mr. Sikes follows his example, it is very hard to see how Rashdall got "for His sake" out of *nil jam tolerare ipsum vera reformidet caritas*. That *ipsum* is difficult, but how can it be rendered "for His sake"?

But the bewildering feature of this translation is, "we are . . . reconciled to God by this singular grace exhibited to us." Mr. Sikes uses the word "manifested" instead of "exhibited." This is a decided improvement. But it does not go far enough, or, rather, it is not clear enough. It is true that we can use the word "exhibit" in a similar way to that in which we use "show" in such phrases as "show kindness to a person." But it can suggest, and indeed does suggest, "displayed for our inspection." But Grace is undoubtedly something given, not something displayed in the hope that we may see that it is so admirable that we ought to emulate or adopt it. Indeed, Grace is not a thing at all. It is God in action on the human spirit. The process of redemption does not take its rise in our contemplation of Christ. The awakening point of the Christian life is the discovery of what Christ has done in us, the time when we come to say, *Quæ commisimus scimus te luere*.

Why did so great a man as Rashdall fail to see this, and place the starting point elsewhere? The answer seems to be that he was a pioneer, and like all pioneers, he had to start from where he was. He stood at the end of the process which had changed the Christ-centred *Solus ad Victimam* into the self-centred *O Deus ego amo Te*, to be echoed later by "When I survey." But he turned his face, and so turned our attention, to that greater man whose redemption was so slow, so long and so painful that he learnt enough to guide our thoughts into the path which will lead us into that fuller grasp of the subject of which Rashdall felt the need. Rashdall has done us the service of pointing out to us the man who sets us on the track which will lead us to understand Christ in ourselves and, therefore, Christ in the Scriptures. As Rashdall saw then, and as is still true, no satisfactory theory of the Atonement has been achieved as yet. But we ought, meanwhile, to be grateful to Rashdall for reviving interest in Abelard, even though we decline to accept Rashdall's verdict, but, instead, take up the clue which he provided when he said, "Abelard sees that God can only be supposed to forgive by making the sinner better." No kind of exemplarism can satisfy that test.

R. O. P. TAYLOR.



## LITERATURE AND REVELATION\*

"I THINK continually of those who were really great," begins one of Mr. Stephen Spender's better poems (*Poems*, 1933, No. xxviii. Faber). Mr. Day Lewis also looks wistfully back, and speaks in similar vein:

For those who had the power  
Unhesitatingly whether to kill or cure . . .  
There need be neither obituary nor wreath  
Accomplices of death.†

This is no mere hero-worship, no evasion of present problems by a sentimental burial of an ostrich head in the splendid but suffocating sands of the past. Indeed, Mr. Day Lewis traces the "spirit of life that nothing can keep down" as communicated from the dead heroes to their survivors:

For I knew, at last wholly accepting death,  
Though earth had taken his body and air his breath,  
He was not in heaven or earth: he was in me.‡

This is an interesting modernization of the doctrine of the Communion of the Saints—though perhaps not so modern, since there is in it a suspicion of age-old pantheism. But there is a difference of means and ends. The best and noblest of the present form but a causeway over which march the armies of the future, and these in their turn yield their bodies to the feet of their successors, and so on in infinite procession to a goal that is never reached. The Communion of Saints, instead of being a vital union between pilgrims on earth and souls fully alive in a more abiding city, is thus perverted into an endless rotation of crops. The sole importance of the past is, apparently, that it lives in the present; the present, then, can decide how best to treat it, whither to move, and on whose dead bodies it shall tread; it has the right, if it wishes, to adopt the programme of

Death to the killers, bringing light to life.§

The dead must be content to be a coat thrown over the puddle of transition so that the new age may walk over dry-shod.

\* With apologies to Trotsky's famous *Essay on Literature and Revolution*. The word "revelation" is not intended in the mystical Middleton-Murphy sense, discussed, for instance, by Dr. I. A. Richards in "Truth and Revelation Theories" (*Principles of Literary Criticism*, ch. xxxiii.), but as suggestive of Christian dogma.

† "A Time to Dance."

‡ *Idem*.

§ Spender, *Poems*, xl.



The supremest achievement of a man is that he may earn the gratitude of his successors who

... are glad as they lay him back in the earth  
And thank him for what he gave them. \*

So that in the Book of Judgment it will be recorded

How this one excelled all others in making driving belts.

Since the materialist interpretation of history is adopted, the ultimate tribunal can only be that of Time, whose autocratic and arbitrary *fiat* rules all:

To-morrow Time's progress will forget us even here,  
When our bodies are rejected, like the beetle's shard, to-day  
Already, now, we are forgotten on those stellar shores.†

This looks like the blackest fatalism, but, no! Apparently all will be well in the end; out of the combat of opposites will grow the synthesis, a demi-Eden where

... you may wonder  
How it was that works, money, interest, building, could ever hide  
The palpable and obvious love of man for man.‡

It is a strange biological or anthropological process that is envisaged. By the denial of love—nay, by the fostering of hatred—this state will be reached. This done, suddenly out of the dead ashes and smouldering ruins of conflict will spring up light, life, and love, phoenix-like into the millennial classless paradise.

To the materialist interpretation of history is added a determinist theory of psychology. Wisely enough our young poets make no serious efforts to maintain consistency in their adherence to either, knowing that that would spell death to their poetry. Mr. Spender, for instance, remarks that "the Marxist tries to accomplish the . . . sacrifice of individualist traits in order to achieve the fulfilment of a more united and wider humanity, by an historic *act of the will* (italics mine) which makes him reach forward and forcibly impose upon the present the visualised and completed social system of the future" (*The Destructive Element*, p. 165). Or, again, that "the Socialist artist . . . is concerned with a change of heart. . . . He is not primarily concerned with ways and means . . . (he) is primarily interested in man, and not in systems, not even in a good economic system. Systems are rigid, they must always be forced externally—by external criticism—to change. In

\* *Idem*, xxxi.

† *Idem*, xxxix.

‡ *Idem*, xxix.



that sense, art, because it insists on human values, is a criticism of life" (*idem*, pp. 228-9). How does he square that with his professed creed? His declaration, for example, that "one of the chief claims of communism as a political creed is that it is materialist. The materialist conception of history, the theory of surplus value, the idea of crystallized labour: all these are solids, they are material subject-matter and yet move in the world of ideas. The writer who grasps anything of Marxist theory feels that he is moving in a world of reality, in a purposive world, not merely a world of obstructive and oppressive *things* (*sic*)" (*idem*, pp. 227-8). The blatant inconsistencies on these pages are sufficient evidence that he is trying to have his cake and eat it; in other words, that the adoption of materialist theories is purely pragmatic. This might have been prophesied from the first. It is noticeable that any sort of professed determinism may in an individual person who professes it be analysed as a rule into the double assumption: (i.) Everything and everybody else is determined; and (ii.) I am not. That is what is bound to happen if the authors under consideration try to maintain a thoroughgoing determinism, and it will betray them into a new form of solipsism which would give us plenty of occasion to charge them with the very individualism they are so anxious to disown. At the moment, however, the significance of their appeal to psychology is rather different. Mr. Day Lewis, in a recent lecture on "The Revolution in Literature" (broadcast in the series "Youth Looks Ahead," and published in *The Listener*, March 27, 1935), describes how his comrades, especially Mr. W. H. Auden, have been vacillating between politics and psychology. He even suggests that we have before us a choice of two religions, politics (communism or nationalism) and the new "liberalism of Freud," though he does not explain how the subjective and quasi-scientific analysis characteristic of psychology can possibly offer in any sense an alternative to the objective religion of nationalism or communism. A religion, he argues, will be found based on psychology, because every religion is based on a "true conception of the nature of the human soul" and Freud has given us such a conception. But even if the principle is true, which I doubt, the conclusion is a palpable *non sequitur*; and the religion which he envisages as resulting, one of "enlightened love" (whatever that is), scarcely gives us reassurance that he is right. Mr. Spender's explanation is more to the point, that communists need to test their communism by means of psychology (*The Destructive Element*, esp. chap. xi.). That accounts for Mr. Day Lewis' reference to the "human soul," and Mr. Spender's belated and hasty recollection



of "human values" above cited. But, briefly, one is bound to ask, By what then do they test their psychology? Later in this essay I hope to shew that an independent witness is needed here—really independent, that is, not with the doubtful impartiality of human courts of appeal.

We have already described the phoenix-like resurrection of life, light, and love which is expected to take place at the Marxist millennium; but a phoenix-like resurrection of culture is also envisaged, and that leads us naturally to Dr. Leavis and the "Cambridge School." Mr. Day Lewis refers briefly to them in his broadcast lecture already mentioned, but his dismissal is too facile, for he merely employs a question-begging metaphor by means of which he is able to bow them out of court. "Scientists," he says, "can remove the heart or a piece of skin-tissue and keep them alive long after the parent body is dead; but the life they will be living is a meaningless one. And I don't feel that a culture artificially preserved from the decay of the social body can have much meaning either." But it is precisely at the preservation of the parent body from decay that Dr. Leavis and Co. are aiming; and it is their contention that the Marxists expect to hasten its death and yet to be able to wave a Hegelian wand over it and restore it to life from the grave. Nor does Dr. Leavis only raise pertinent questions about the transition period (see *For Continuity*, esp. p. 163). He attacks also the more distant, teleological question of how a culture, which can only thrive by close and intimate connection with the productive powers, can be a culture in any real sense of the word when in the ideal communist state the productive forces with which it is to be "integrally associated" are so mechanically efficient as no longer to determine the ordering of life (*idem*, p. 166). The criticism has yet to be adequately answered, and the objects of *Scrutiny*, if a trifle self-conscious and pretentious, are to be commended. The task of criticising Book Society standards and unchallenged mass morality is certainly of great importance to-day (cf. especially Mr. Denys Thompson's brilliant, if perverse, "de-bunking" of Lamb-Stevenson-Lynd irresponsibility, and Mr. J. L. Russell's even more effective and level-headed exposure of the easy and unfounded assumptions regularly made in the Jeans-Eddington "scientific best seller," *Determinations*, ed. Leavis, 1934). But it is legitimate to ask whether literature will bear all the weight placed upon it. Even in this "Cambridge School" under discussion we can see growing up a rigid orthodoxy, of a higher standard certainly, but no less arbitrary than the popular orthodoxy they set out to criticize. "Poetry is capable of saving us," cries Dr. Richards, with a note of despair in his



voice; but what else is this, as Mr. Eliot is never tired of pointing out, but a variation on Matthew Arnold's substitution of poetry for religion?

Outside these two groups of poets and literary physicians who have come under brief consideration there will be those—perhaps a big, though a steadily decreasing, majority—who will decry any attempts to turn literature in general or poetry in particular into Social Service. “We must have more detachment,” they will exclaim. I am afraid that this usually means either a claim to surrender with languid or voluptuous luxury to the particular thrill of the moment—a claim which cannot result in anything but the most dissipated and undisciplined artistic creation—or else an attitude of haughty and often vindictive superiority. If this interpretation is unfair to some of the exponents of this position it can only be because they come under the category I shall endeavour to sketch below—a category of persons who can only in a superficial and obvious sense be called detached. But if, as I fear is most frequently the case, my double paraphrase of their creed is applicable to those who profess it, I cannot do better than offer for their consideration a saying of L'Abbé Huvelin: “Le détachement ne doit jamais être pratique pour lui-même; je ne me détache que pour m'attacher. Je lâche le mauvais ou le moins bon, pour saisir le meilleur ou le parfait. Jamais je ne lâche, pour tomber en un trou” (in *Selected Letters of F. von Hügel*, ed. B. Holland, p. 59).

I may as well confess—indeed, the space allotted to them betrays it—to a strong sympathy for those who are concerning themselves as poets and as men with the future of society, as against those who stand aloof and superior, preserving the “purity” of literature. But my quarrel with the former is that, though no doubt they would call themselves realists, they are not realistic enough; and unfortunately the only single word to describe those who are ostensibly realist but fundamentally, if unconsciously, idealist is “sentimental.” Mr. Michael Roberts finds in the communist attitude “the recognition of the importance of others . . . the recognition that oneself is no more important than a flower in a field; that it may be good to sacrifice one's welfare that others may benefit; to plough in this year's crop so that next year's may benefit: the return is certain, what matter who receives it?” (Introduction to *New Signatures*, 1934). If this is an attitude which may genuinely be discovered to-day, that is admirable—it is at least less self-regarding and self-assertive than that usually exhibited by *Scrutiny*. But without making obvious gibes at the intellectual public-school communism—what Dr. Leavis calls the “higher boy-scouting”—it is not unfair to call it



muddle-headed and heroically fatalistic: "Why ask about the results of martyrdom, so long as at any rate we *are* martyred!"  
An apparent parallel in Eliot's

I say unto you: Make perfect your will.  
I say: take no thought of the harvest,  
But only of proper sowing.\*

exhibits precisely the distinction we hope to indicate below, that between fatalism and a belief in a personal God. In any case it is further questionable whether this attitude Mr. Roberts acclaims is often more than superficial: it may be fairly sincere, but it is angry and political; it is materialistic and counts success by numbers; it is fanatical with the fierce righteousness of the self-consciously righteous. The preoccupation with revolution, and we may say the same to some extent of the preoccupation with culture, is a preoccupation with the trees to the obscuring of the wood: it is the blindness of the man who is so close to the wall that he proceeds impatiently to batter it down without first stepping back to a position from which he can overlook it and see what is on the other side and whether there is a way round. The connection between this sort of sentimental attitude and the artistic creation of those who adopt it should be generally obvious even if hard to discern in detail. This is not the place, nor have I the ability, to enter into a discussion concerning the nature of poetic truth. But this much may perhaps be said. Coleridge's advice to readers of poetry to adopt a "willing suspension of disbelief" may only be applied with safety to those cases where, as Dr. Richards says, "the question of belief does not arise" in any vital sense. We do not need to believe in ghosts to appreciate *The Ancient Mariner*: we can temporarily project ourselves into an imaginary world and "make-believe" it is true. But though it is admittedly difficult to draw the line, there comes a point where sheer unbelief in the reader must hinder a full appreciation: it may be held that the childish petulance and precociousness of *Queen Mab* damages, if it does not destroy, its value as poetry; and that if for some people the *Divine Comedy* is no whit less mythological, or has no closer correspondence to reality, than *Kubla Khan*, then for them the level of understanding of the two poems becomes entirely different. Miss Helen Wodehouse, in an able criticism of Dr. Richards' *als ob* method of "imaginative assent," quotes Donne's Sonnet on Judgment Day:

O Thou who Satan heard'st in Job's sick day:  
Hear thyself now, for thou in us dost pray. . . .  
Hear us, weak echoes, O thou ear, and cry.

\* *The Rock*, p. 9.



"It is possible," she points out, "to disbelieve in Job and Satan and a good deal more beside, and yet to enter into this. But if we enter into it, we cannot, I urge, be judging that for us, as contrasted with Donne, there is nothing in it" (Art. "Poetry and Truth," *Philosophy*, Oct., 1934). If then we apply this to "sociological" poetry it will be clear that the poets under consideration, by identifying themselves with what may be, as we have contended it to be, an unreal and sentimental creed, are in danger of tipping their poems over the edge into the purely mythological pool: the creations into which they have poured, we presume, much of their heart, mind, soul, and potentially, so to speak, body (i.e. loyalty), are hardly likely to have the same value as poetry if they are discovered to be the mere gossamer products of fairy-land. A less disputable, though somewhat similar, aspect of this connection between belief and poetry may, however, be found by an examination of the distinction—so easily made but so precarious—between the poet as poet and the poet as man. When Mr. Day Lewis, in the broadcast lecture already referred to, states that "a revolution in literature is now taking place" but that "a revolution in society is incomparably more important," it is clear that he is using the word "revolution" equivocally—he can hardly mean to use it univocally, for, as he well realises, a revolution in literature preceding a similar revolution in society could not but be highly artificial. But in any case it is clear enough that there is a close connection between the two—as we can see from the light thrown on the poetry of Wordsworth by his letters, especially one in 1801 to C. J. Fox, revealing revolutionary interests (Prof. Harper, *Life of Wordsworth*, chap. xiv., p. 329). This, however, only serves to enforce our point that if a social, political, or philosophical doctrine adopted at any time by a group of poets may be shewn to be unrealistic, fantastic just in those points where its supporters most fiercely repudiate fantasy, transitory and sentimental, the poetry that results cannot but suffer from the same eccentricity.

It will be evident that so far the first half of my title has been discussed and the second half neglected. Nay, worse, it may be said that so far I have only discussed the first half in an arbitrary fashion, picking on vulnerable points in belief and practice and not attempting serious literary criticism. To that I should reply that I prefer to leave literary criticism to those who are competent to practise it; I am attempting no more than what may be called an essay in selection with a definite purpose in view. That purpose is deducible from the second half of my title, to which I shall now turn. As a sort of a text I should like to cite a remark from a very able article



entitled "Literature and Revolution" by Mr. L. C. Knights, published in *The Highway* (W.E.A. Journal), Oct., 1934, an article hardly likely to be prejudiced in favour of the conclusions I shall deduce from it. Mr. Knights, touching upon three points in which the relation between economic organization and culture in the days prior to the Industrial Revolution differed radically from that relation in an industrial age, remarks that the third, "the machinery for transmitting traditional wisdom," is hardly available to-day except in the written word or in "a church that is neither dead to contemporary problems, nor engaged in keeping itself thoroughly 'modern.'" He clearly does not want that paragraph to mean as much as I shall make it mean, but it may serve without undue distortion to introduce the second half of my argument. I have dealt with two groups who are anxious to turn literature into Social Service—fussy, because self-conscious and artificial Social Service. In the first we found that some were already turning to the outside help of psychology to balance their belief, and we tentatively asked whether a third something or someone was not needed to stand in the middle and steady the see-saw; in the second we observed such a preoccupation with literature in isolation that the patient was expected to undergo treatment and carry the surgeon on its back at the same time. Finally we touched upon a third solution based on "detachment," of which the result appeared to be a miraculous feat of literary levitation. But we darkly hinted that there might be a detachment which could only in an obvious and superficial sense be called detachment, and which might be found to be satisfactory and self-consistent. It may by now be clear that by this I mean an attitude of detachment from the transitory and of dependence on the eternal. Lest this seem mere mystical vapouring, let me hasten to express my meaning first by two negatives and then, I hope, by an affirmative. First, it is significant—our study above should have given us some indication of the fact—that what is primarily lacking to-day, in literature as everywhere else, is a sense of ultimate values, a discrimination between what is permanent and what is merely temporary. Second, lest this seem equally indefinite, it is significant that when the Church is mentioned in literary and intellectual circles (and Mr. T. S. Eliot has at least forced such mention to be made, though the general conclusion seems to be that the Church stands or falls by him, and that he does not know his own mind) she is regarded, at best as a political party, at worst as a West End Club. The quotation above from Mr. Knight's article seems to reveal this attitude. So does Mr. Day Lewis' remark, "(Mr. Prufrock) became a leader of fashion. Then,



to the visible embarrassment of his young associates, he suddenly tired of it all and joined the Anglo-Catholic persuasion" (*A Hope for Poetry*, p. 23). So does Mr. Spender's reference to "Eliot's retreat to the Anglo-Catholic Church" (*The Destructive Element*, p. 222). In fact, the Church is regarded as a sort of safe castle from which to hurl occasional darts: "T. S. Eliot took over the position of Anglo-Catholicism. It is, perhaps, a sufficient commentary on this last position that a man of such poetic ability as Eliot should have found himself incapable of launching a satiric attack from it" (*A Hope for Poetry*, p. 41). What is common to both these tendencies which I have called significant is that they reveal a false over-estimation and abstraction of the intellect as such, and a singular failure to recognize the existence of the human soul—a failure which is not mitigated by the Communist Intellectuals' appeal to psycho-analysis, or, for that matter, by Dr. Leavis' concession to what he calls an "inner human nature" (*For Continuity*, p. 186). Only Mr. Edmund Wilson appears to have it right. Quoting Eliot's dictum that "it is doubtful whether civilization can endure without religion, and religion without a Church," he says outright: "Yet you can hardly have an effective Church without a cult of Christ as Son of God; and you cannot have a cult without more willingness to accept the supernatural than most of us to-day are able to muster" (*Axel's Castle*, p. 126). That is just it, and it was honest of Mr. Wilson to admit it. The joining of a Church which is the outward sign of the acceptance of a religion may look little different to the outside world from the filling in of a membership card for a literary society, but the step that is really taken is more "costing" than that, as the late Baron von Hügel would say. There must be the yielding of the individual to the claims of the eternal and supernatural—call it mumbo-jumbo, if you will, but do not call it political or literary dilettantism. I do not think, though, that that is what is meant when Mr. Spender classes Mr. Eliot among the individualists (*The Destructive Element*, chaps. vii. and viii.), nor when Mr. Michael Roberts says that Mr. Eliot's choice of the Church of England was due to his innate individualism—"the instinctive Protestantism of the Anglo-Saxon," characterized by reliance "upon the senses rather than the intellect" (*Critique of Poetry*, p. 217). The conception, indeed, of humility or of willing passivity seems to be entirely lacking in literary and intellectual circles; even our disillusioned leaders of thought are still self-assertive in their disillusionment—while crying, "We do not know where to turn," they at least assume that they are a pivotal point for civilization. If we are to find anywhere a realistic and ultimate



*via media* between the excellent though misguided enthusiasm of those who in a tight corner put down their heads and desperately try to ram the enemy, and the aloof and haughty cynicism of those who sit still and critically survey the field from a safe distance, it can only be discovered, I am convinced, by a humble dependence upon a power outside—a dependence which alone results in the apparently impossible combination of both attitudes, of active enthusiasm and critical detachment.

Here again this may sound like a meaningless and mystical abstraction. If so, I can only refer to the well-known paradox that the greatest material achievements of the Christian religion (and one does not need to be a historian to know how far-reaching these have been, and in what a variety of fields) have been more or less incidental epiphenomena to the Christian life, not produced by a fussy concern for the immediate, nor by a fatalistic disinterestedness, but by the pursuit of the highest and most abiding, because supernatural, goods. "An example in point is the beneficent effect on art, literature, and social conditions in general directly traceable to the personality of St. Francis of Assisi, who all through his life troubled himself very little about any of the three" (A. E. Taylor, *Faith of a Moralist*, i., p. 204). This, of course, passes the comprehension of the materialistic world. Christianity is considered, as Rousseau described it long ago, as "an entirely spiritual religion connected solely with heavenly things"; "in it the essential thing is to reach Paradise," so that any achievements of the Church in the practical world are effected in spite of herself. Applying this line of argument to the more limited field of literature, it will be assumed, no doubt, that the Christian's one ambition here is for a revival of devotional poetry. This is a precisely similar misunderstanding. In point of fact, such a revival would not be, even from the Christian point of view, an unmixed blessing. Something of the sort occurred in the days of George Herbert, and Henry Vaughan tells us what that was like: "After him (*sc.* Herbert) followed diverse—*sed non passibus æquis*; they had more of *fashion* than of *force*. And the reason of their so vast difference from him, besides differing spirits and qualifications (for his *measure* was eminent), I suspect to be, because they aimed more at *verse* than *perfection*, as may be easily gathered by their frequent *impressions* and numerous *pages*. Hence sprang those wide, those weak, and lean conceptions which in the most inclinable reader will scarce give any nourishment or help to *devotion*; for, not flowing from a true practick piety, it was impossible they should effect those things abroad which they never had acquaintance with at home: being only the productions of a common spirit,



and the obvious ebullitions of that light humour, which takes the pen in hand out of no other consideration than to be seen in print" (Preface, *Silex Scintillans*, 1654). Of course, there was excellent devotional poetry as well—that of Vaughan himself, Crashaw and Traherne, all three good minor poets. And of course it is to be expected that a religious revival to-day, if such a thing were imaginable, might well result in a recrudescence of devotional poetry. The point is that it would be of very limited importance. One might express this in another way: the significance both of the devotional verse and of the magnificent pulpit prose of the seventeenth century lies not so much, perhaps, in the fact that we find good poetry and good prose dealing with religious subjects, but rather the other way round, that "hagiography" (as Vaughan calls it) and homily should naturally dress itself in the fine garments of sensitive poetry and expressive prose; not merely that literature should be pleased to concern itself with religion, but that the religious and literary tradition should have been so closely connected that the stuff of the former should automatically shape itself in the mould of the latter. But even in the seventeenth century it had to be preceded by something of a conscious revival, so that for a safer example we must go further back. It would be more pointed to say that Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*, even including those which "sownen into synne," and which he was willing to revoke in his "retraciouns," are as directly Christian poems as his prayer to Our Lady ("An A B C"). That is to say, Chaucer, both as a Christian man and as a poet, was concerned with the whole of life, and attempted no artificial division (except in the obvious matters of organization and institution) into secular and religious affairs: hence his sane outlook and his humanity; hence, too, his very real sense of the equality of all men, not relative to each other according to individual computation in an infinite regress which paradoxically ends in a *saute qui peut*, but under God. It is just such a sanity that we long for to-day, but it is not easily recoverable: it is doubtful even to what extent a tradition of this sort is obtainable "by great labour," as Mr. Eliot suggests it is (*The Sacred Wood*, p. 49). Any sort of short cut is useless. A doubtful metaphor used by Mr. Day Lewis, to which we have already referred, might perhaps be adapted to our purpose. There are two things which cannot be done to a mortally sick patient: the first is to adopt the method of Dr. Leavis and Company, and paint his finger tips with iodine; the second is to follow the Marxist way of treating the human body as if it were a plant, cut off a leg, throw away the rest, and nurse the surviving limb in a potting-shed, hoping that a



new man will one day grow from the slip. A wiser course would be to discover the root of the disease—in this case, the human soul—and treat that. But the essential paradox of the metaphor is that we are all the patients and that in claiming the right to prescribe for each other we are creating such a situation as would result if a doctorless and nurseless hospital were to be staffed by the patients themselves—a situation resembling the insoluble problem of the three snakes eating each other. The physician must come from outside and bring order into the chaos, and we must accept his diagnosis and prescription, summoning up the courage and the humility (it requires both) to say with Chaucer,

Lat not my foo no more my wounde entame;  
Myn hele into thyn hand al I resygne.\*

W. R. JARRETT-KERR.

\* "An A B C," 79-80.



## MISCELLANEA

### ENGLISH CHURCH LIFE IN 1850

LATELY I opened the bound volumes of *The Ecclesiastical Gazette* for 1849-50 and to my surprise found them so interesting that I was led to make notes on their contents. The magazine was published monthly by Charles Cox, whose office was near the Strand. It was in a way better than anything we have today. The three columns of small print were filled with official news: Parliamentary debates reported in full when they affected the Church, detailed accounts of law suits and of the proceedings of Church Societies, missionary intelligence, clerical preferments and marriages, and University events. All this was pedestrian enough. Whatever was significant has passed into the history books, and the Review scrupulously refrained from taking any line of its own in Church matters. But it was far ahead of its time in commercial enterprise. Copies were sent free to all beneficed clergy, 7,000 in number (new parishes being excluded), and on the strength of this a remarkable number of advertisements were obtained. In one number twelve pages of small type are thus filled. In these pages and not in the news part lies the interest of the Review. We overhear the clergy of the day in their business negotiations and their controversies, and we realize the unconscious assumptions of their lives. The sale of advowsons occupies much space. The details are frankly shocking. Clergymen advertise for advowsons or next presentations, stating how much they are willing to give. The amount varies with the age of the incumbent. Sellers generally give his age. He is 88, 91, in feeble health, incapable of any duty, etc. There are several agents. One declares he has many hundred benefices to sell. Another that he has many advowsons still for sale, "although near the close of the season." Inducements are held out that half the purchase price may be held over until the death of the incumbent, or that interest will be paid on the whole amount until his death. The value of the livings is remarkable. A large proportion of them are from £1,000 to £2,000 a year. The Church Association is prominent among the agents who advertise this class of business. But the prince of agents was Mr. Ancona, presumably a Jew. Here is one of his notices, describing a valuable advowson, "offering an unusually advantageous opportunity for purchase by any gentleman desiring to combine his duty with a large income and first-rate establishment. The parsonage is a handsome modern mansion approached by a park lodge, and standing in beautifully timbered park land, tastefully laid out with shrubberies and pleasure-grounds. The population is small, and income nearly £2,000 a year." The same agent has a client willing to pay up to £12,000 for a suitable advowson.

The conclusion is irresistible that when W. S. Gilbert wrote "The Reverend Simon Magus" in *The Bab Ballads* he was not caricaturing certain of the clergy.

A rich advowson, highly prized,  
For private sale was advertised;  
And many a parson made a bid;  
The Reverend Simon Magus did.



He sought the agents: "Agent, I  
Have come prepared at once to buy  
(If your demand is not too big)  
The Cure of Otium-cum-Digge."

"Ah!" said the agent, "*there's* a berth—  
The snuggest vicarage on earth;  
No sort of duty (so I hear)  
And fifteen hundred pounds a year!

"If on the price we should agree,  
The living soon will vacant be:  
The good incumbent's ninety-five,  
And cannot very long survive. . . ."

"But now about the parsonage.  
How many rooms does it contain?  
Show me the photograph again.

"A poor apostle's humble house  
Must not be too luxurious;  
No stately halls with oaken floor—  
It should be decent and no more.

"No billiard-rooms—no stately trees—  
No croquet-grounds or pineries."

"Ah!" sighed the agent, "very true;  
This property won't do for you.

"All these about the house you'll find."  
"Well," said the parson, "never mind;  
I'll manage to submit to these  
Luxurious superfluities."

And so on, up to the final touch that the vendor is a Jew. There is no sign that advowsons are being bought to safeguard a particular version of Anglican teaching; all is unblushing commercialism. Perhaps we have done well to have checked the evil as far as we have succeeded in doing. But I prefer to think that the Church of England has rightly lost much of its influence over the nation as a just punishment for its corporate worldliness, of which it has repented only half-heartedly.

The advertisements of proprietary chapels read curiously today. A clergyman desires "to purchase a chapel in the West End of London." A 62 years' lease of a chapel is offered, seating 1,000 persons and producing £600 per annum if all seats are let; the present rent is £150. The Church Association advertises: "Freehold Episcopal Chapel, with its appurtenances, to be sold, suited to an Episcopalian of rather High Church views. . . . Price £1,800."

By the side of the rich incumbents were the poor curates. The lowest salary offered is £50: "should the applications be numerous, some will necessarily be unanswered." £80 seems a standard salary. A London curacy of £100 is offered. By the side of this I notice a Second Assistant Master wanted for a public school, for £40 residence. Nearly every number, by the way, contains an advertisement of a nomination for Marlborough, a bargain, or being sold cheap. Books were more expensive than they are now. Single sermons are published at 1s. or a higher price; Lectures on the Catechism at 18s.; Tupper's *Proverbial Philosophy* at 7s. and upwards. One tailor proclaims that, since the usual price for a clergyman's suit of six guineas is too expensive for some, he has devised a five-



guinea suit. The poor curate of Victorian novels was a reality, like the rich Rector.

How did the poorer priests live at all? Often tuition saved them. Fashionable clerical coaches could ask as much as £200 a year for pupils. Some clergymen came down to £30 or £40. Curacy wanted, says one, "with a fair probability of obtaining pupils." Girls were generally educated at home. Governesses offer the rudiments of Latin, German and Italian, besides French thoroughly taught. Indeed, Italian is frequently mentioned. One boarding school for girls tells us that it teaches everything "from the first solid and well-grounded basis to the elegant and accomplished superstructure."

The lot of a Secretary to a Society was much better than that of a curate. An Organizing Secretary to the London Hibernian Society is offered £250.

The advertisements for curates throw a light on the views of those who framed them. Requirements are completely different from those of today. "Ritual" and "ceremonial" are unknown words and "Catholic" occurs once only. A few ask for daily service and observance of festivals, but the general tone is Low Church; Tractarianism is disowned sometimes. The commonest description is the equivalent of our "no extremes," namely "opposed alike to Romanism and dissent." The Archbishops occur several times as a standard of orthodoxy. "Testimonials of agreement with the views of the Primate indispensable," says one Vicar. Another, a patriotic Northerner, says: "Wanted an earnest and pious curate, whose doctrinal views are in accordance with those of the Archbishops of York and Canterbury." Elsewhere we find "sentiments in accordance with those expressed in the writings of Simeon, Venn, and Scott, etc."; Dr. Hook's doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration is wanted by one Vicar; another says "what admits of clear demonstration from Barrow's works will not be disapproved." This would-be curate is cautious: "he assents . . . in so far as he understands the subject to [the doctrine] of our Lord's personal advent and millennial reign"; but this one was a firebrand—he will observe all the laws of this Church "in all their length and breadth. In doubtful cases he must always refer to the Bishop for guidance." Was the applicant who wanted a curacy where he may have a chance of "conforming to the liturgy" a simple soul or a humorist?

A fair number of applicants for livings, and even some for curacies, offer to contribute to the Church or School Building Fund if appointed, which reminds us of the very rapid increase of population and the extent to which the clergy taxed themselves to provide churches and schools. Minor matters of clerical interest are the humble beginnings of the summer holiday exchange of work system; the Auto-Crematic Gown, devised to meet "the many complaints of the clergy of their robe slipping down the back as they preach"; and the many advertisements of barrel organs, for use in church or at family worship. These are described as if they were scientific novelties. An organ with 10 tunes costs £15; one with 30 costs £80. An enterprising firm has introduced an "index," by which the name of the tune may be ascertained before it is played. But what is a "Seraphine for use in church, £18"? As in private duty bound I welcome the advertisement of "Bacon's Family Hotel": "its quiet central situation and proximity to the offices of the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge render it particularly adapted for gentlemen of the clerical profession."

School teachers are as well represented as curates in these columns.



Elementary education was managed by the clergy, who used their professional journal for getting teachers. A school house was provided for man and wife, who were responsible for the teaching, helped by pupil teachers. A typical salary for the two is £45. £40 with children's pence, reckoned to bring in £10-12, is another typical offer. Portsea was big enough to have a separate girls' school, the mistress ("headmistress" does not occur in these advertisements) of which was paid £40. Applicants generally claim to be proficient in psalmody; one is proficient in "spade agriculture."

Proprietary articles, other than chapels, are few, but the firm of Rowlands advertises regularly. "Ladies travelling, or enjoying the Rural Ride, a Drive, or Aquatic Excursion, or while otherwise exposed to the rays of the sun," are advised to buy Kalydon, *as used by the Queen*. Rowland's Pearl Dentifrice was also used by her. Rowland's Macassar Oil was bought by the Royal Family. The Queen's name is not mentioned, but the dates suggest that she prescribed it for the future Edward VII. and thereby helped to promote the flourishing Victorian industry of manufacturing antimacassars. This surely is a valuable piece of research on my part. Has any historian recorded what Queen Victoria put on her toothbrush?

W. K. LOWTHER CLARKE.

## 2 TIMOTHY II. 14-16.

14. *Τάντα ὑπομύνησκε, διαμαρτυρόμενος ἐνώπιον τοῦ Κυρίου (θεοῦ W. H.) μὴ λογομαχεῖν εἰς οὐδέν χρήσιμον, ἐπὶ καταστροφῇ τῶν ἀκούοντων.* The reference of *Τάντα* is to the fruitfulness of suffering patiently with Christ taught in verses 1-13, and provides a contrast with the fruitless controversies against which Timothy is to warn his flock. *Solemnly testifying before God that they debate not about mere words* (E. F. Brown, *Westminster Comm.*, *ad loc*) is a very strong phrase. It may point (1) to the well-known weakness of Eastern Christians for theological hair-splittings. (2) In any case St. Paul had found by experience that it led to *moral and spiritual ruin*—*καταστροφή*. Timothy must tackle the evil with impressive authority as regarded the Church.

15. His own line must be, on the one hand, to devote himself to God for the true work of his ministry. *Σπύδασον σεαυτὸν δόκιμον παραστήσαι τῷ θεῷ ἐργάτην ἀνεπαίσχυντον, ὀρθοτομοῦντα τον λόγον τῆς ἀληθείας.* I think it was Bishop Luke Paget who suggested to us many years ago in a sermon at an Ely Theological College Festival that *ὀρθοτομοῦντα* might be a metaphor from tent-making (Acts xviii. 3), and refer to the importance of cutting out the sections and gores of a tent accurately, if the tent was to make up well.

16. *Τὰς δὲ βεβήλους κενοφωνίας περιῖστασο κ.τ.λ.* For *περιῖστασο* E. V. gives *shun*; Browne, *But from profane empty babblings stand aside*. This is in strong contrast to the solemn public warning of verse 14, and is great advice. To ignore deliberately a controversial clamour which enthral the feeble mind is in endless cases first-class tactics. Masterly silence is to be combined with the solemn warning of verse 14, and the absorbing attention to his own business of verse 15.

We have, then, a well-thought-out policy defined under three heads:

(1) The flock must be solemnly warned that to allow themselves



to become preoccupied with fruitless religious controversies will lead to moral and spiritual *catastrophe*.

(2) The bishop or parish priest must be absorbed in his own proper theological studies and pastoral responsibilities, gradually getting the true lines of Christian faith, morals, and discipline well arranged in his mind: not, indeed, "cut and dried"—that metaphor is not suggested—but well thought out, in preparation for efficient speech and action. He will do this in the sight of God, prayerfully, so that he may give a good account of his stewardship in due season.

(3) And he will shun all such secularly minded (*βεβήλους*) discussions of matters which sound very profound but are really hollow and empty (*κενοφωνίας*). They boom with a deep, hollow sound, like a fog-horn, but have no spiritual substance, no Word of God, in them: pompous talk of a pseudophilosophical character, perhaps, full of fashionable catchwords, but leading only to flippancy and irreverence (*ἀσεβεία*), and later on to heresy about fundamental matters like the resurrection of the body (verses 17, 18). The word *shun* reminds us how we can often best preserve our dignity and the dignity of the Faith by looking steadily over the head of much that is said and done, blanketing it with silence and a studied inattention, which will be much more discouraging and economical of time and energy than any other policy.

The "solemn warning before God" of verse 14 is protection enough against the opposite danger of thinking that absorption in trivialities is in itself a trivial matter.

F. M. D.

#### NOTE ON 1 PET. II. 19, 20.

HAS not Mr. Downton in his note on 1 Pet. ii. 19, 20 missed the point of the parable in Luke xvii. 7-10? A merely just master does not thank his servant for merely doing his duty. The strictest performance of our duty to God establishes no claim on the divine gratitude, and it is well that we should remind ourselves of this. But in Luke xii. 35-37 we have our Master set before us as not merely just but loving, One who meets our imperfect service with overflowing generosity, to which we have no claim. Both in 1 Pet. ii. 19, 20 and in Luke vi. 33 *χάρις* appears to express the disposition of the devout servant or child of God as distinct from natural and instinctive appreciation of what is just and fair. Other passages of Scripture abundantly shew that such a disposition is not a personal merit but a gift of grace, a *χάρις* or (to be more strictly accurate) a *χάρισμα*, because it reflects and answers to *χάρις*.

C. E. SCOTT-MONCRIEFF.

BUXTON VICARAGE,  
August 12, 1935.

#### "PUBLIC SCHOOL SERMONS."

AN article by W. H. Oldaker, in THEOLOGY, July, 1935.

"I should say that the main interest of the boy of fourteen to seventeen, if not nineteen, is a practical one. He wants to hear whether the Christianity he is taught, with greater or less enthusiasm, has any relevance to the world into which he will go. He is certain to have met many



people already—masters included—who are not convinced of that relevance."

Is this the same thing as speaking of "an economic theory of religion"? Does it not amount to a recognition of, or a surrender to, the claim that religion must be shewn to be a "paying proposition" in the affairs of this life, and to be a practical help to a boy in "carving out a career" for himself?

Also, why speak of "the world into which he will go"? Has he not verily and indeed entered already the world with which he has to deal? Or else, what is the contrast (for the purposes of religion) between his present school-world and the world into which he will go?

If Mr. Oldaker means by "the world into which he will go" the "life of the world to come," which, however, it is fairly certain he does not, the relevance of religion comes out well in Bishop Butler's dictum, "We are in this world to prepare for another."

I wonder if it is a good thing to make "this world"—or for a school-boy to make "the world into which he will go" in Mr. Oldaker's sense—the centre of gravity of effort and aim?

✠ M. S. O'RORKE  
(Bishop).

ST. AUDRIES,  
TAUNTON,  
July 19, 1935.

## NOTES ON PERIODICALS

*Jewish Quarterly Review*. Vol. xxvi., No. 1.

M. M. Fagan in reviewing Janowsky's *The Jews and Minority Rights* recalls the observation of Lord Acton that the political liberty of mankind has been won by religious minorities struggling for equality and justice. He points out that today, while minorities are undergoing oppression at the hands of dominant majorities, political liberty is being replaced by Fascist imperialism, and military alliances between dictators are supplanting the post-war idealism of a League of Free States.

Dr. Joshua Finkel bestows high praise on Professor J. A. Montgomery's *Arabia and the Bible*, in which the influence of Arabia is declared to be the basic factor in shaping the destinies of Israel. Israel's monotheism was desert born. "Out of the land of Midian and the Hijaz to the south arose Israel's religion and Islam." In both, although with difference in spacial quantity and moral quality, we observe a movement arising within an Arab population, under a great leader who imposes law in the name of his God upon his people and establishes a theocratic State."

Professor Joseph Reider in his article on *Biblical Literature* reminds us of the loss to scholarship through the tragic death during the 1929 Arab riots in Jerusalem of Harold M. Weiner, whose constant challenge of modern Old Testament criticism was always worthy of attention even when it failed to find acceptance.

R. D. MIDDLETON.

*Ephemerides Theologicæ Lovanienses*. January, 1935.

The opening article of this number is an essay by Fr. L. Cerfaux on the composition of the Third Gospel. After a lengthy examination of various theories he concludes that the "Two Document" hypothesis is



inadequate to explain the facts that we have in Luke a source incorporated which differs from our Mark and that this source has its base in the Aramaic tradition which was committed to writing by Matthew.

The next article, by Fr. F. Gregoire, is a very interesting discussion of the reasons which determine the very small place which messianic theories or speculations have in the extant works of Philo. There are, it seems, only two eschatological passages of any importance, and the vague figure of a Messiah can be traced only in one of them. He is an entirely subordinate personage, a military captain under whose leadership the people of the Jews will finally overcome their enemies and be enabled to fulfil their divine mission for the benefit of the whole human race. Philo is thus altogether removed from the kind of messianic speculation which we find in the New Testament. To him the perfect prophet, priest and lawgiver is Moses, and he will do nothing to obscure the greatness and uniqueness of this figure. The work of Moses, final and complete in itself, is to prepare a priestly and saintly nation whose mission it will be to spread the true Religion and the true Law throughout the world. This wise nation will be a nation of kings: here the curious Stoic doctrine of the kingship of the sage finds an application. The ideal is entirely universalist and pacifist. As regards those passages in the Prophets which we should naturally think of as "messianic," the "Suffering Servant" and so forth, Philo shews little knowledge of them and in no way connects them with the idea of a Messiah or with the divine destiny of Israel.

Fr. Zigon concludes his Latin articles on the problem of sin and divine providence, drawing out the distinctions between the "antecedent reprobation" of Calvin and the milder, but less rigorously logical, views of St. Thomas and his later followers. The reader feels that but little light has been shed on these mysteries by the long and laborious speculations of moralists of various schools and nuances.

The rest of the number is taken up with book reviews that do not seem this time to call for any special notice.

W. R. V. BRADE.

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*Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses.* April, 1935.

This is an interesting number. It begins with a careful study by Fr. V. Heylen of the use of metaphor and metonymy in St. Paul's Epistles, tracing the employment of these figures of speech from the earliest Epistles right up to the Pastorals. In the earlier phases there is no great extension of their use, but the "Great Epistles"—Romans, Galatians, Corinthians—are the richest both in quantity and quality in this respect. This continues through the Epistles of the Captivity; Philippians is especially remarkable for metaphors drawn from military and civil life. In the Pastorals the material is again restricted. The usage in all these various documents points to unity of authorship. The Apostle's general method is to employ tropes to impress on the mind of his readers some verity which is clearly before his own mind; he does not use them for the purpose of direct proof. Such metaphors have been largely responsible for the forms actually taken by the language of Christian theology. To analyze the "mystical" passages in St. Paul from this point of view would require a separate essay, but the reminder to the student that metaphor here also plays its part will keep him from subscribing to extreme theories of hellenistic and pagan influences.



The next article is in English, a somewhat rare feature in this Review. It is by Fr. L. L. McReavy and is entitled "The Sunday Repose from Labour." It deals with the period from the New Testament to the age of Charlemagne, shewing how at first the only idea in asking for cessation from ordinary tasks on Sunday was to give the faithful time for their liturgical worship. All sabbatarian thought was eschewed. To Irenæus *opus servile*, "servile work," means simply sin. But a new direction of thought appears later. Thus, Martin of Braga (sixth century) in his *De Correctione Rusticorum* interprets *opus servile* as agricultural labour and entirely forbids it on Sundays. In Gregory of Tours we get reports of many alleged miraculous punishments of those who dare to break these rules. A wave of sabbatarianism passes over Europe. In England the *Penitential Theodori* (circ. 668-690 A.D.) tends to react against it; at least, not the Old Testament, but "the tradition of the Greeks and the Romans" is quoted in its favour. Bede takes a reasonable view, but, as the writer of the article remarks, he is "a lonely figure in an age of much law-making and little erudition."

A short article suggests a new reading of the Hebrew of Psalm ii. 11-12. Under the rubric *Chronica* we are informed that a Pontifical Indult for Russia allows the special privilege for the faithful in that country to receive Holy Communion in the evening provided that a fast of six hours is maintained previously.

W. R. V. BRADE.

## CORRESPONDENCE

### REUNION

*To the Editor of THEOLOGY.*

SIR,

I have only today received the August THEOLOGY and I should like, if it is not too late, to make some comments on the two letters in it which concern my article "The Approach to Reunion."

The Reunion of Christendom is a glorious ideal. I believe that our work for it in this generation is to prepare the ground; to occupy ourselves not so much with Reunion itself as with the approach to it. A changed attitude is needed on the part of the sundered portions of Christendom in order that a great longing for Reunion may grow among Christian men. This change is taking place, but it is not very widespread yet. We are still living in an atmosphere where controversy means primarily, not convincing a friend of the truth, but gaining a victory or silencing an enemy. I believe that this change of attitude will grow if groups of Christian men will meet for discussion determined to overcome at all costs (short of sacrificing their principles) every incompatibility and irritation in the effort to understand each other's deepest convictions and to rid ourselves of the entanglement of misconception about each other with which we are all surrounded.

Proselytizing is a tendencious word: if it means convincing others of the truth as we see it it is a duty; if it means gaining adherents by unfair means or partisan tactics it is a crime. But proselytizing of the latter



inadequate to explain the facts that we have in Luke a source incorporated which differs from our Mark and that this source has its base in the Aramaic tradition which was committed to writing by Matthew.

The next article, by Fr. F. Gregoire, is a very interesting discussion of the reasons which determine the very small place which messianic theories or speculations have in the extant works of Philo. There are, it seems, only two eschatological passages of any importance, and the vague figure of a Messiah can be traced only in one of them. He is an entirely subordinate personage, a military captain under whose leadership the people of the Jews will finally overcome their enemies and be enabled to fulfil their divine mission for the benefit of the whole human race. Philo is thus altogether removed from the kind of messianic speculation which we find in the New Testament. To him the perfect prophet, priest and lawgiver is Moses, and he will do nothing to obscure the greatness and uniqueness of this figure. The work of Moses, final and complete in itself, is to prepare a priestly and saintly nation whose mission it will be to spread the true Religion and the true Law throughout the world. This wise nation will be a nation of kings: here the curious Stoic doctrine of the kingship of the sage finds an application. The ideal is entirely universalist and pacifist. As regards those passages in the Prophets which we should naturally think of as "messianic," the "Suffering Servant" and so forth, Philo shews little knowledge of them and in no way connects them with the idea of a Messiah or with the divine destiny of Israel.

Fr. Zigon concludes his Latin articles on the problem of sin and divine providence, drawing out the distinctions between the "antecedent reprobation" of Calvin and the milder, but less rigorously logical, views of St. Thomas and his later followers. The reader feels that but little light has been shed on these mysteries by the long and laborious speculations of moralists of various schools and nuances.

The rest of the number is taken up with book reviews that do not seem this time to call for any special notice.

W. R. V. BRADE.

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kind (which is not the monopoly of any one side) will disappear when hostility and suspicion have given way to friendship and the desire to understand.

But the Rev. C. B. Moss demands a good deal as the condition upon which he will co-operate. He will not help in the growth of a new spirit and outlook; he would have them there before he will begin. He claims the right of free criticism for Anglo-Catholics and Protestants, but he would have Rome's strict censorship used to forbid controversy of all kinds, both public and private. Salmon, Denny and Fr. Puller may attack with their crushing logic, but all retaliation must cease.

I should be the first to admit that much of our controversy is useless and harmful, because it is conceived in a false spirit; its aim is victory rather than truth, and it irritates but does not persuade. But I do not believe in the cessation of controversy. We need controversy, but controversy that seeks first the truth in those who differ from us, that seeks solely to commend the truth which we believe ourselves to possess and that is inspired by the charity of Christ.

May I quite briefly reply to the points of criticism raised by the Rev. Roger F. Markham?

If by the word *descended* I had meant the lineal descent of our hierarchy today from the pre-Reformation hierarchy, I should of course have been incorrect. No such descent, I believe, can be traced, and Father Humphrey, S.J., is right in speaking of our present Bishops as having received a new mission straight from Rome. I was speaking, however, of the tradition of English (Roman) Catholicism which has been handed on, often in unbroken succession, from generation to generation ever since the days of Queen Elizabeth. This may be verified by anyone who cares to consult the Recusant Rolls of one of the English counties.

We should, of course, strenuously deny that the (Roman) Catholic Church has added to the deposit of the Faith in any other manner than (let us say) the Nicene Creed or the Council of Chalcedon added to it.

My omission of any reference to the Marian persecution was due to the fact that there was no context in my article in which it could have been introduced. I was concerned, in the passage referred to, to point out that as a matter of historical fact the Church of England was for nearly 300 years a dominant and persecuting religious body, and that this fact must not be lost sight of by Anglicans who really wish to understand and sympathize with the traditional attitude of Roman Catholics to their Church. I am well aware that for a short period under Mary the positions were reversed, and that but for an accident of history they might have continued so. But I was concerned with the effects of history as it actually happened.

Yours, etc.,

HENRY ST. JOHN, O.P.

BLACKFRIARS SCHOOL,  
LAXTON,  
STAMFORD.  
August 21, 1935.



## CHRISTIANITY AND HISTORY

DEAR SIR,

You kindly allowed me to publish in the July number of THEOLOGY an article entitled "Christianity and the Faith of Humanity." In the editorial of the same issue you made that article the subject of your remarks and the object of attack. I fully recognize the dangers involved in my approach to the Gospels, and with your desire to save what you deem to be Christian orthodoxy from disintegrating assaults of Modernist theologians I sympathize. But the fact that your editorial tended to misjudge what is my point of view and missed the real point at issue constrains me to try, in as short a space as possible, to make clear what I believe that real point to be.

In defending Monsieur Loisy I had no wish to stir up controversy; rather I hoped to demonstrate my belief that he makes a constructive contribution to the cause of Christianity, that he offers guidance to those who would wish to translate Christian beliefs into the language of the present age. Thus I am delighted to read that "we are in harmony, if not in unison, like St. Paul and St. James"; I am more than satisfied that "what promised to be a very interesting controversy has fizzled out."

The point at issue for modern theologians is, I believe, not whether Christianity is or is not rooted in history and founded on facts, but what is meant by the word history. It is more important to know on what grounds anything may be called historical than it is to postulate its historicity. For example, the essential question for theologians in regard to the Resurrection is not so much "Did it happen?" as "What do we mean when we say it is an historical event?" How may history be defined? What constitutes history? What is meant when it is claimed that Christianity is based upon historical evidences? These are fundamental questions concerning the nature of history; and it is essential that the modern theologian should attempt to work out a solution to this most pressing and exceedingly baffling problem. In facing this problem and in making constructive suggestions towards its solution, Monsieur Loisy and others have done much to save Christian theology from becoming a branch of the science of archæology.

I will endeavour briefly to set out my attitude to the problem of the nature of history in regard to Christian origins.

The foundations of the Christian religion are the facts of our Lord's life and death and Resurrection; but I believe, with many others, that the interpretations put upon those facts by humanity have given their significance in the life of humanity, and have thus welded them into the fabric of human history. This is not to say that man has made the facts into acts of God; it is to believe that God acts through human channels. He demands response in men to His actions before they become historical events. Facts give rise to response, whether as faith or disbelief; and this response endows them with their "soul," their "life," making them into living realities of history. Facts of the past which educe no human response, whose influence does not extend into the present, cannot in any true sense be called historical; they are forgotten and are as though they never had been. The fact that at this moment I smoke a pipe is a bare fact which will probably be forgotten to-morrow. It may become an event of historical interest if it can be shewn, truly or falsely, that it has in some way influenced what I am now writing!



It is not possible to prove the truth of Christian dogmas based upon the Gospel stories simply by critically treating the records without reference to the response made to the facts underlying them. In order to preserve inviolate the edifice of Christian orthodoxy it is not sufficient to say that the events of our Lord's life narrated by the Evangelists are historical; it is necessary also to explain on what evidence the statement is made, and what is meant by it.

The Jesus of history is the Risen Lord of Christian experience, not the Galilean of the theological archæologists. Not only is it impossible to find in the Gospels the bare facts, untangled from the interpretations which have been put upon them, but also, if found, they would tell us nothing of value of the historical Jesus, and they would certainly form no adequate guarantee of the truth of the Gospel. Bare facts unrelated to the response which they call forth in men are meaningless for humanity, and they are of as much value in life as used postage stamps. The test of the historicity of the Gospel stories is ultimately one of judgment and not of scientific research. Academic criticism may assist in the forming of a judgment, but only a Christian is in a position adequately to estimate whether or not the postulates of Christian faith are historical. Without facts there would be no history; but what exactly those facts are is unimportant except in respect of the response they have evoked.

What do we mean by the word historical? That is, then, the fundamental query for theologians to try to answer; it is ultimately a question of philosophy. And it is this question which you have ignored in your criticism of my article. History is made up of fact and interpretation of fact; the two are inextricably interwoven. It is true that there is the further problem, which again is one of philosophy, of how we are to discern what is the correct interpretation to be put upon facts. The only suggestion which I can offer is that the voice of humanity, in accordance with its highest and best perceptions or moral and spiritual ideals and aspirations, must decide.

"By their fruits ye shall know them" is the only satisfactory test of the truth of dogmas, so long as the fruits are judged to be good or bad in accordance with a really enlivened conscience of humanity. And such an hypothesis evades the issue whether or not God stirs up that conscience by means of direct revelation. It is not sufficient to say that we accept as "historical Christianity" what has been handed down to us. For we may understand, for example, something which has been handed down by Irenæus in quite a different way from that which he intended. Words used in one age bear, sometimes, quite a different meaning in another; words are understood in the light of the environment and context in which they are used.

In considering whether or not the Gospel records are historically true it is necessary to approach the New Testament through the channels of interpretation. That is to say, we can only perceive the meaning of the records if we approach them with sympathy for the faith of the primitive disciples; we can therefore only determine if they are true when we are prepared to look upon them as records written up in the light of faith, faith in the Risen Lord as the Messiah of God.

The method of "liberal criticism" is to try to cut away from the Gospels all accretions due to the faith of the disciples, and so to find a series of bare facts which should present us with a true biographical portrait of Jesus. It is an impossible method, and completely sterile. Either the



critic begins with preconceived theological notions, then pares away all that is not in accordance with such preconceptions, or he becomes an archaeologist and finds, not the Jesus of history, but a corpse of the museum of past events. In the former case he joins hands with the fundamentalist; for with the material left to him after his surgical operations he remains a literalist. Both the fundamentalist and the "liberal critic" begin with preconceptions which neglect the important place of interpretation in history. It is essential, if Christianity is to remain a live power in history, that the Gospels should be allowed to tell their story of faith in the environment and context of each successive age. Jesus of Nazareth is the object of Christian faith; He is the Risen Lord of Christian experience, the revelation of God's love, and the power of the Christian way of life. That is the Gospel history.

I have, I hope, said sufficient to shew what, I believe, is the main point at issue for modern theologians in regard to the consideration of the historicity of Christian dogmas, and also to demonstrate on what lines, in my opinion, the Gospels should be approached. That this letter adequately fulfils the purpose of its writing I dare not hope; that the views expressed in it represent, in a measure, a strong rising movement amongst Christian theologians today I am convinced. And the cry of "gnosticism" will not stem the tide. It is unsatisfactory, surely, to accuse me of cutting Christianity loose from history without first meeting the challenge of "What do you mean by the words history and historical?"

Yours sincerely,

L. J. COLLINS.

WESTCOTT HOUSE,  
CAMBRIDGE.

August 30, 1935.

## THE HOLY COMMUNION AND THE SPIRITUAL BODY

DEAR SIR,

Your correspondent will find some discussion and references to the above in: (1) *The Passion and Exaltation of Christ*, by F. J. Hall (volume in *Dogmatic Theology*, Longmans, 1918), pp. 254-5. (2) *Eschatology* (vol. x. in same series), pp. 70-1 and 155-6. (3) *Revelation of the Father* (Westcott), p. 40. (4) *The Historic Christ* (T. A. Lacey). (5) *Survival after Death*, by C. L. Drawbridge (Christian Evidence Publications). Cf. also Hooker, Book V., lxviii. 12.

Yours faithfully,

G. E. BOYLE.

WYKEHAM LODGE,  
CANFORD CLIFFS,  
BOURNEMOUTH.



## REVIEWS

THE RELEVANCE OF THE CHURCH. By Canon T. R. Barry.  
Nisbet. 7s. 6d.

It was, no doubt, inevitable that the author of *The Relevance of Christianity* (now happily in its fifth edition) should have been challenged to provide a sequel explaining the relevance of the Church. There may, however, be those who will argue that no necessity for such a sequel should ever have arisen, since the relevance of Christianity, properly understood, involves and even presupposes the relevance of the Christian Church: and there will certainly be others who will suggest that the subject to which Canon Barry has now addressed himself is more adequately covered by Father Hebert in his *Liturgy and Society* (Faber, 12s. 6d.), and by Canon Hudson in *Preface to a Christian Sociology* (Allen and Unwin, 4s. 6d.).

But, when all this has been said, the fact remains that Canon Barry has given us another intensely stimulating book, and one for which we all have reason to be grateful. It has an almost electric quality. It is superb conversation; it is magnificent pulpit oratory. It may be read and re-read with advantage. But, like much pulpit oratory, it is not altogether easy to pin it down. And the reader should bear in mind that while the author writes of the relevance of the Church, he is thinking primarily of the relevance of Anglicanism—as distinct, indeed, from “Church-of-Englandism,” for Dr. Barry is as impatient to dissociate himself from the hide-bound orthodoxy of Dr. Thwackum as Dr. Thwackum would have been to dissociate himself from the “enthusiasm” of Dr. Barry; nevertheless, it comes as something of a shock to read that “if Anglicanism fails the world now, it is no other form of Christianity which will win its allegiance, but paganism.” (It is, however, possible from the context that “its” refers only to “the people of England.”)

Dr. Barry appears to be gravitating slowly towards the Right. There are certain indications that his progress is to some extent retarded by an excessive preoccupation with, and deference to, what undergraduates are thinking, as if this were a matter of paramount importance; and he seems to overlook the undergraduate habit, admirable in itself and at that stage, of talking almost for the sake of talking. (We recollect some caustic paragraphs in Mr. G. M. Thompson's *Criterion Miscellany* pamphlet on the Lambeth Conference of 1930.) But there is already a pointed insistence, not merely on “the



spirit of worship," but on the real importance of actually "going to church." At the same time, Dr. Barry still is more alive to the dangers in Catholicism than to its underlying strength. He is suspicious of the formal and impersonal. "It is probable, I think, that in future the institutional factor in the Church's life will come to seem less and less important." We can see what he is getting at: "An introverted Church has no future. . . . The worship of the Church fails if it does not succeed in relating the response of man to God's other claims in the broad field of life as a whole." But is it introversion from which the Church of England is most conspicuously suffering today? Charles Marson long ago described as her characteristic weakness the habit of "attempting boundlessly too much, and intensively too little."

Yet this book has the root of the matter in it. "Worship *must* come in the first place; and the Church has been entirely right in the tremendous stress which it has laid upon it. The danger of religiously-minded people is to think that devotional and liturgical exercises are all that the will of God for the world requires of them. But the primary emphasis in Christian worship is the acknowledgment of God's sovereignty. . . . The spiritual gifts are bestowed for the sanctification and redemption of all that Christians may undertake for the glory of God and the service of mankind. . . . Thus all legitimate 'secular' activities . . . are functions of the priesthood of all believers. . . ." And, in an age of increasing specialization, "more than ever the Church will be needed to . . . restore to life unity and significance." Such opinions can indeed no longer be accused of dangerous novelty. Christianity means the linking up of individual life with a supreme and all-embracing Purpose. But we are uncertain what Dr. Barry would make of the dictum of Gregory of Nyssa: "Christianity has its strength in the mystic symbols."

It is, however, reassuring in a general way to note the growing consensus, not merely of opinion, but of emphasis, among Anglican publicists, that "the Church," as Dr. Major puts it, "is essential to the Christian Religion. It is needful, in order to enable it to carry on the mission of Christ to mankind. . . . Without the Church, the Christian Religion would not have survived, and without the Church it cannot triumph." "It must, so far as I can see," writes Mr. Kenneth Ingram, "express itself collectively if it is to function individually. There must be a Church." Canon Barry agrees whole-heartedly: "The Church is part of its own Gospel . . . without the Church, Christ is unfulfilled." And his prophetic eye is brightened by the vision of the Church of England, reformed and purged by "a creative



reconstruction of our thought and teaching" with regard to it, no longer "contaminated by the virus of the 'ecclesiastical' mind," dissociated in the popular imagination from a too intimate connection with "the existing capitalistic system and the bankers' control of money," and generally humanized and brought up to date. Already "the Anglican interpretation of the faith bequeathed to us by our predecessors appears to be uniquely adapted to meet the religious needs of our own time." But only because "the genius of the Anglican inheritance is experiment working upon tradition. . . . The spirit of Christ is essentially creative, and must embody itself in new forms with the changing needs of changing generations." Here he seems to be trying to say what Dr. Paul Elmer More has said so admirably in his preface to *Anglicanism*: "The *Via Media* is not compromise; it is direction." Incidentally, Dr. Barry's book includes a section on the Ordering of Worship, which is full of practical suggestions, some of them quite excellent, and which might be circulated with advantage to all incumbents. He also has many valuable things to say about such great books of our time as Barth's *Epistle to the Romans*, Nygren's *Agape and Eros*, Oman's *The Natural and the Supernatural*. And he is, above all, a thinker who has not yet finished thinking. But his new apologia suffers from that preoccupation with the idea and with the business of activity of which Barth has been so theologically critical; and he seems to forget that the Church is, perhaps primarily, Christ's sacrificial Body offered in sacrifice for the world.

CHARLES SMYTH.

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CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY: THE DOCTRINE OF GOD. By the Right Rev. A. C. Headlam, Bishop of Gloucester. Clarendon Press. 12s. 6d.

The Bishop of Gloucester has conferred a great benefit on the world of examining chaplains and theological students by publishing the substance of some of his professional lectures. So far as the Christian doctrine of God and Christ is concerned, the book contains, as the author claims, just what the average student should attempt to learn. Hopes are held out that another volume may follow containing a similar treatment of Creation, Redemption, Grace, the Church, the sacraments. May they find fulfilment!

We have, then, essentially a textbook. It is difficult to get away from the feeling that here is provided ample material for giving a really creditable answer to any question which may be fairly asked in G.O.E. For such an object, indeed, the book



is perfectly adapted. But, inevitably this makes dull reading. One subject after another is raised, dealt with, and then dismissed just when we hoped that Dr. Headlam would let himself go. He tells us that he has not thought it necessary to remove all traces of the lecture-room. No, indeed!

We can almost hear the scratching of the pens of diligent note-takers. Certainly there is not a word they could afford to miss! "The important thing for a student to know is that he may neglect most books" on systematic theology; but the wise student will certainly not neglect this one. It contains something about everything. It is by Dr. Headlam: and that is to say that it is trustworthy, balanced, critical, judicial, sober, authoritative. It contains the intellectual nucleus for a multitude of doctrinal sermons. It provides solid arguments and historical facts wherewith to counter shallow criticism of fundamental Christian doctrine. His scepticism about scientific dogmatism is stimulating. "All this sounds very unreal" is more damaging than pages of argument. If the general impression gained from the book (with the exception of the last few pages) is somewhat intellectualist, that is involved in its character. It is not a description of the Christian Religion: it is theology, the intellectual basis of that religion.

Perhaps the most important practical problem which is raised is the question What must an ordinand believe? It must be remembered that the Bishop does not hold any doctrine of infallibility. Where, then, are we to "draw the line"? The answer is so important that it had better be given in the author's own words: "He must be prepared, without committing himself to this or that detail, without necessarily accepting every phrase and definition, fully to accept that conception of Christ which is put forward in the New Testament and has been taught throughout Christian history by the Christian Church. . . . It is that God became flesh. It is that He who was Son of God 'for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven, and was incarnate . . . and was made man. He suffered and was buried. The third day He rose again.'" So much at least of infallibility Dr. Headlam seems to allow to the general consciousness of the Christian Church.

For the rest, we are led steadily along the straight path of systematic theology. The first part deals with the sources of religious knowledge, natural religion, the Bible, the Church, and with its conception of religious authority. The second and longer part deals historically and critically with the doctrine of God, of Christ and of the Holy Spirit. In spite of the Bishop's dislike of any form of infallibilism, he does in fact invariably accept the Conciliar definitions: indeed, he states roundly that



six General Councils are accepted by the Church of England, and sees no reason against the acceptance of the seventh.

The last chapter but one, on the doctrine of the Trinity, is unlike anything else in the book. Dr. Headlam for once departs from the rigidity of his plan, and shews us what he can do when he allows himself to be discursive. It is a great relief.

KENNETH BRECHIN.

**FREEDOM AND THE SPIRIT.** By N. Berdyaev. Geoffrey Bles: the Centenary Press. 12s. 6d.

M. Berdyaev must be tired of being called a prophet; and indeed the title, though it has become a cliché among reviewers of his books, is less apt than his own description of himself as a "Christian theosophist." This large and at times brilliant and profound treatise is compounded of two main ingredients, Russian Orthodoxy and the kind of mysticism we get in Jacob Boehme. M. Berdyaev's own list of his forerunners—Origen, St. Gregory of Nyssa, Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa, Jacob Boehme, St. Martin, Francis Baader and Vladimir Solovyov—indicates sufficiently well the standpoint from which he approaches the many profound questions he raises.

His fertility of thought is immense, and we cannot here notice more than a few of his main conceptions.

The spiritual philosophy of Orthodoxy is different from that of Western Catholicism, and one of the many merits of this book is the striking way in which the difference is elucidated. The theology represented supremely by St. Thomas Aquinas, with its metaphysics and its rationalism, its clear-cut distinction between Creator and creature, supernatural and natural, seems to Orthodoxy a naturalizing of Spirit, a kind of "Church-positivism." For Orthodoxy the knowledge of the divine is a dynamic process, and the divine life, Berdyaev says, in its inexhaustible mystery, bears no relation to what is affirmed through the medium of rational concepts. Orthodoxy, Platonist and mystical, prefers potentiality and creativity: Thomism, with its Aristotelian background, seeks everywhere actuality and concreteness. The difference is emphasized in Berdyaev's doctrine of the Church. "The Church is not a reality existing side by side with others; it is not an element in the historic and universal whole; it is not a separated objective reality. The Church is all; it constitutes the whole plenitude of being, of the life of humanity, and of the world in a state of Christianization. It possesses a cosmic nature, and to forget this means decadence." Hence the Church is, above all, something in-



visible, inward, and mystical. Yet there is no Protestantism in Berdyaev's view. The Church is also visible and actualized. "The Church incarnates itself in history, as Christ became incarnate"; and it is visible in the life of Christ, in the lives of the Saints, in the sacraments, in its hierarchy, communities, councils, etc. A similar attitude appears in the treatment of tradition. The life of the Church, Berdyaev tells us, rests upon holy tradition and succession: but tradition is not authority; it is the creative life of the Spirit, and authority is declared to have no meaning in the creative life of the Spirit.

The mystical emphasis in Berdyaev's teaching affects all the great themes of religion. Spiritual life comes first in the order of thought. It is reality itself: it exists in its own right. To conceive of God as a metaphysical, transcendent Being, an immobile Substance, or as an external supernatural Power, is declared to be idolatry. God is life and cannot be expressed in terms of categories of thought which were framed to deal with nature; He can only be revealed in spiritual life. Immortality means an entering into the life of the spirit and laying hold upon it, and human personality is immortal not because the human soul possesses substantiality, but because there is a spiritual experience of eternal life, because that spiritual life is divine-human, and because Christ exists as the source of that life. Freedom is the freedom of the spirit; it is not to be found within the human soul (Berdyaev strongly insists on the need for distinguishing between soul and spirit) or within the world of nature. Apart from Christianity there is no freedom, and determinism is always supreme; for freedom of spirit, like immortality, is not natural to man. Freedom, for Berdyaev, is a mystery belonging to the inmost depths of spirit, a principle of being prior to all organized and perfected life, bound up with the matter of life, the potential energies of spirit which are the ultimate stuff of being.

With this doctrine of freedom Berdyaev links in a subtle way his teaching on the Holy Trinity and the God-Man. "The source of man's freedom is in God, and that, not in God the Father, but in God the Son. But the Son is not only God, but man in the absolute and spiritual sense of the word—that is, the Eternal Man. The freedom of the Son is that in which and by which the free response to God is effected. It is the source of the freedom of the whole human race, for this freedom is not only that of the natural Adam, but also that of the spiritual Adam—that is, of Christ." It is Berdyaev's view that humanity is from eternity present in the Second Person of the Trinity, and he speaks of the "human Hypostasis in the Divine Being." "In the Son the unique spiritual man and the whole spiritual



race of mankind are mysteriously united. . . . The absolute Heavenly Man is both the unique Man and the whole of *sobornny* humanity." This daring conception of a human element in the Eternal Godhead before as well as after the Incarnation is central to Berdyaev's thought. It would be interesting to see how he would reconcile it with the Nicene doctrine that the Son was *made* man at the Incarnation, but I can find no clear statement on that point.

This line of thought is not far from Gnosticism, and Berdyaev occasionally plunges into some very queer speculations. He denounces ancient Gnosticism as a failure to grasp the fundamental mystery of Christianity; the Gnostics, he says, were not even Christian heretics, they were pagan initiates who had absorbed some elements of Christian wisdom in a syncretistic manner. He also rejects modern theosophy with contempt. But he follows Eckhart and Boehme in some of their more extravagant fancies without turning a hair. For example, he quotes with approval Boehme's identification of the Blessed Virgin and the Divine Wisdom; and the Virgin Birth of Christ is said to restore "the integrality of man's image" as "male-female." It follows that sex is merely the result of the Fall: "sex with its generative function . . . is the result of sin and separation from God." We confess we cannot swallow all this; but in the rich mixed diet which Berdyaev's book provides the less palatable ingredients are small compared with the rest. His stimulating and fearless thought is by now widely and rightly appreciated. As a speculative thinker he is not far from genius; and genius, not least Russian genius, will have its wayward moments.

H. BALMFORTH.

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## NOTICES

CHARLES I. AND THE COURT OF ROME : A STUDY IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY DIPLOMACY. By Gordon Albion, D.Sc. Hist. (Louvain). Burns Oates and Washbourne, 1935. 15s.

The devotion of Charles I. to the Anglican Church and his complete satisfaction with its theological position are beyond dispute even by his most austere critics. If that Church crowned him with the aureole of martyrdom it was not without his giving an ample reason for doing so. But the Anglican viewpoint in its more Catholic version has always been a puzzle to the Roman Catholics of the Continent, and it is not surprising that hopes should have been entertained of his conversion, the more so because to the interested eyes of foreign observers his dynastic interests seemed to push him in that direction. The Puritans were the bitter



opponents alike of the Church of Rome and of the Stuart absolutism, and the best chance of putting them in their place might appear to be in solidarizing in some way the two objects of their aversion. Charles himself was not unwilling to give some encouragement to this idea, though certainly not to the extent of declaring himself a Roman Catholic. Not only was he concerned to conciliate Catholic support within and without his kingdom against the opponents of his personal rule, but he was also anxious to secure the good offices of the by no means unsympathetic Barberini Pope, Urban VIII., on behalf of his sister Elizabeth, the exiled "Winter Queen" of Bohemia. In return for these advantages he was at least ready to procure for the persecuted Roman Catholics of his realm some considerable mitigation of their lot, especially if the Pope would withdraw Rome's condemnation of the oath of allegiance that many of them would have been quite ready to take if left to themselves. A further ground for such toleration lay in the fact that his French Queen was a Roman Catholic. As such she naturally desired not only relief for her English co-religionists, but also the presence of some authorized representative of Rome—preferably a Cardinal of English birth—who might put an end to the divisions that harassed and weakened them.

Such was the situation that lay behind the curious and interesting parleyings with Rome which occupied the years immediately preceding the Civil War and were the occasion of the presence at the English Court of three papal agents in succession. These parleyings form the main subject of Father Albion's new book. Written as a thesis for the doctor's degree at Louvain University, it is a work of real importance, being largely based on hitherto unpublished documents in the papal archives. The story of a protracted and complicated negotiation, especially when, as in this case, it ended (and could only end) in smoke, is not an easy subject to make interesting. But Father Albion's account makes the best of it, being always lucid and well written. For the general reader its main attraction will be in the vivid contemporary light that it throws on the King and his immediate entourage at a critical period of the royal fortunes—on the cultivated, well-meaning, but tortuous Charles, his mercurial and indiscreet wife, the timorous crypto-Catholics who were his counsellors, the rather queer group of aristocratic converts of the time, and above all on Laud, whose steady and unflinching loyalty to the Church of his baptism is strikingly revealed in Father Albion's not very sympathetic presentment. The Archbishop might not be averse from reunion with Rome as an ideal, but, if it came, it would have to be on his own terms. He was bent on pursuing his own *via media* and declined to conciliate Rome at the expense of further antagonizing his Puritan opponents. The hope of corporate reunion, entertained by certain Anglicans on the one hand and by unauthorized Roman Catholic enthusiasts as the Franciscan convert Davenport on the other, received small encouragement from him. The accomplished Scots envoy from Rome, Mgr. Con, was equally unsympathetic—an attitude encouraged by the false optimism excited by the individual conversions in what after all was a very narrow and unrepresentative circle. Thus even before the triumph of Puritanism in the Long Parliament it was clear that reunion was a dream without substance.

C. S. PHILLIPS.



**SAINT BEDE THE VENERABLE.** By H. M. Gillett. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 2s. 6d.

A little book with a purpose. It lays special stress on England's debt to Rome for her conversion and on the Venerable Bede's reverence for the Holy See. It devotes a whole chapter to the setting forth of this by a seventeenth-century Jesuit. For the same reason the work of St. Aidan and his companions in the evangelization of Northern England is represented as little more than an obstacle to the Pope's plan for a united Church. St. Bede, on the contrary, while frankly saying that he detests St. Aidan's views about Easter, gives a most charming and appreciative account of his life work.

For the rest the author has drawn an agreeable picture of one of the most attractive of our English saints, and has taken pains to make it accurate.

The monasticism of Wearmouth and Jarrow was no doubt Benedictine in its general features. The early Benedictine abbots slept in the common dormitory, according to rule. When, therefore, the Venerable Bede stated that Eosterwine did so after he became abbot, he did not mean that he was denying himself a privilege, but merely that he kept the rule, which was more than some abbots did then. Is there any authority for saying that the lamp burning always at night in the dormitory was "probably before some holy picture or shrine"? It usually stood there for a much more prosaic reason.

HUBERT NORTHCOTT, C.R.

**PALESTINE AND ISRAEL.** By Flinders Petrie, Kt. S.P.C.K. 3s. 6d.

It is impossible to disregard any of the work of our veteran Biblical archæologist, and there is much in this little volume which deserves attention. The author has thrown together thoughts on a number of different subjects—archæology, ethnology, religion, history, higher criticism—without bringing them into a co-ordinated whole.

Naturally such a book is of uneven value. The best parts are those which deal with archæology and ethnology, especially where Sir Flinders is relying on his own excavations. He has been more successful than any of his predecessors in correlating archæological discoveries with the Biblical record, and almost tells us what the archæologist means by the term "Hyksos." But he clings to a nineteenth dynasty date for the Exodus—a heresy for which the "higher critic" would be excommunicated—and his attempts to vindicate the chronology of the Pentateuch by altering the figures are hardly convincing.

Like so many archæologists, he is contemptuous of "higher criticism," which he does not seem to understand. But there is, nevertheless, much of interest and of value in this little volume, and a special word of thanks may be added for the excellent and illuminating plates.

T. H. ROBINSON.

**PREFACE TO A CHRISTIAN SOCIOLOGY.** By Cyril E. Hudson, Hon. Canon of St. Albans. Allen and Unwin. 4s. 6d.

The work of teaching religion will, as many think, more and more be carried out by means of discussion-groups. The preacher's *ipse dixit* has



long ago ceased to carry weight: the lecturer's deliverances are questioned. The pulpit dialogue is obviously "a put-up job." But the free discussion of a subject by a group of interested enquirers will have a result out of all proportion to the numbers engaged. Canon Hudson has had this in mind in preparing a small but valuable book which should stimulate and guide such discussion. It is a little too "highbrow" for many parishes, and presupposes a certain amount of acquaintance with literature and sociology. And the price is too much for a book of 135 pages. The chapter on the Church's Prophetic Functions, with which the book opens, is admirable in its insistence on the importance of proclaiming the Gospel, the whole Gospel and nothing but the Gospel. Borrowing Professor Goudge's epigrammatic phrase, "Christianity à la carte" is dismissed as foredoomed to failure, for the reason (which should be obvious but is not) that a world which rejects Christ and the grace He offers is scarcely likely to accept His moral principles, which need grace for their carrying out. The chapter on "Our Present Discontents" is an examination of industrial and social tendencies in the manner of Mr. Maurice Reckitt, to whom the book owes much. The concluding chapter on the spiritual resources of secularism contains a remarkable admission by Professor Jung that he had no guidance to give to those who consulted him, not because they were neurotic, but because they wanted to find a meaning in life. It is the claim of this book that Christianity furnishes the answer, but it is a pity that this is not expanded. It is the weakest part of the book. But perhaps we should not expect a "Preface" to do more than state the problem and introduce the factors, and this Canon Hudson has done with great skill.

M. DONAVAN.

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THE CRAFT OF PRAYER. By Vincent McNabb. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 2s. 6d.

The title is deceptive. We have here no treatise on prayer, but a number of addresses, based on Gospel incidents, delivered at widely different times on the subject of prayer, and including a retreat course on the Lord's Prayer. There is in consequence a good deal of repetition, and the scope is limited. The author, using the simplest language, concerns himself mainly with petitionary prayer. That is the fundamental prayer—"Prayer in its essence is an intelligent asking for what God has not yet given us." Such prayer must be made morning and evening; it must be lived out in daily life and service, and it must be persevered in. In short, he gives much useful advice, and does it with unusual freshness, often driving in the lesson with homely illustration. Fond of paradox, he succeeds sometimes in startling his readers—e.g., God "is so shy," or "Like ducks and drakes we can praise God by a gabble." Some sayings go deeper: "We must not pray because we love prayer, but because we love God."

Father McNabb seems to delight a little too much in trailing his coat tails—e.g., in his references to contemplation or the liturgical movement—but there is no room to tread on them here. Besides he knows well enough that in practice prayer is far from being "almost the easiest thing in the world."

HUBERT NORTHCOTT, C.R.



## BOOK NOTES

*The Church's Real Work.* By Canon R. C. Joynt. Longmans, Green and Co. 2s. 6d. The Bishop of Winchester in a Foreword commends this little book by his Canon Missioner to the study of both clergy and laity. It is full of practical advice and excellently written: one rejoices in the author's good sense and balanced judgment, particularly where questions of finance and the Church Assembly are concerned; the insistence on the responsibility of the lay people in the work of the Church is most timely. This book should be prominent in every parochial library.

*The Lord's Prayer.* By Canon Leonard Hodgson, D.D. Longmans Green and Co. 3s. 6d. This little book consists of six sermons preached in Winchester Cathedral during Advent and Christmastide. For the most part, he takes St. Luke's version of the Paternoster and expounds it with that brilliant mixture of learning and practical sense which we have learned to expect from the author. It is well worth reading, and profits on the book go to the revenues of Winchester Cathedral.

*Christian Theism in Contemporary Thought.* By R. C. Legge. 2s. 6d. In this book, Mr. Legge, the Vicar of St. Mark's Parish Church, Victoria Park, E. 9 (from which address copies may be obtained), reviews the traditional arguments for the existence of God and criticizes or defends them against modern objections. The book consists mostly of quotations, and is extremely dull to read, but might be of service to anyone confronted with questions from modern opponents of Christianity, who has little time for study. The chapters reveal wide reading, sound training, and much industry on the part of the author.

*Seer, Scribe and Sage.* By R. C. Legge. 1s. This pamphlet is a study in Judaism during the Greek period, and provides a useful summary of the literature, thought, and history of the time preceding our Lord's birth. Teachers who are attempting to discuss the Apocrypha with their children would probably find this a useful investment.

F. R. ARNOTT.